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Abstract
The ever-growing interconnectivity of industry and infrastructure through cyberspace has
increased their vulnerability to cyber attack. The lack of any formal codification of cyber
warfare has led to the development of contradictory state practices and disagreement as to
the legal standing of cyber warfare, resulting in an increased risk of damage to property
and loss of life. Using the just war theory as a foundation, the research questions asked at
the point at which cyber attacks meet the definition of use of force or armed attack under
international law and what impediments currently exist in the development of legal
limitations on cyber warfare. The research design was based on using the Delphi
technique with 18 scholars in the fields of cyber warfare and international law for 3
rounds of questioning to reach a consensus of opinion. The study employed qualitative
content analysis of survey questions during the first round of inquiry in order to create the
questions for the 2 subsequent rounds. The first round of inquiry consisted of a
questionnaire composed of 9 open-ended questions. These data were inductively coded
to identify themes for the subsequent questionnaires that consisted of 42 questions that
allowed the participants to rank their responses on a Likert-type scale and contextualize
them using written responses. Participants agreed that a computer attack is comparable to
the use of force or armed attack under international law, but fell short of clearly defining
the legal boundaries of cyber warfare. This study contributes to social change by
providing informed opinions by experts about necessary legal reforms and, therefore,
provides a basis for greater legal protections for life and property.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The topic of this study was the lack of regulation over cyber warfare under current
international laws of war and the potential repercussions in loss of life and property. The
ever growing interconnectivity of industry and infrastructure through cyberspace has
increased their vulnerability to assault and potentially from anonymous threats. These
threats include the use of malicious software to damage or even destroy key sectors of
society. The capabilities to commit such acts are part of a modern class of warfare that
has gone largely ignored by international law, even as its potential increases (Dipert,
2010). As a result, in this study I examined how the actions of states under cyber warfare
may be limited in much the same way as they are under traditional warfare.
The destructiveness and suffering of civilian populations during wartime has led
to the creation of numerous international laws of war that may have applicability in cyber
warfare. In most cases, however, precedence will need to be established, and new laws
developed by the international community. These laws will need to be agreed upon
based on international standards rather than the current system of unilaterally developed
policies that risks escalating interstate tensions (Sofaer, 2010). Therefore, the chief
potential social implication of this study is the potential protection of human life and
property as a result of the implementation of the recommendations that are presented here.
In Chapter 1 of this study, a background and summary of the literature associated
with the laws of war and the gaps in the literature applicable to the use of computer
viruses in cyber warfare is provided. These themes are further expanded upon in the
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literature review and are accompanied by research into the application of customary law,
global commons status for cyberspace, and the concept of state neutrality as it pertains to
cyber warfare. Additionally, the theoretical framework of this study is introduced, based
on Michael Walzer’s modern adaptation of the just war theory and is expanded upon
further in the literature review. Lastly, this research stemmed from a qualitative
methodological tradition and was based on a Delphi method that includes snowball
sampling techniques. The research paradigm is presented in Chapter 1 and described in
greater detail in Chapter 3.
Background of the Problem
Over the last 150 years, the way states view the justifications for and conduct of
combatants during war has changed dramatically. The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868
stated that the only legitimate objective of war is to degrade an opponent’s military
capacity (Greenberg, 1998). In the Twentieth Century, the development of nuclear
weapons changed military strategy from winning wars to avoiding them. The reality of
warfare may again change with the advent of cyber warfare, but its potential is not yet
apparent as a cyber conflict has yet to occur on the necessary scale (Geers, 2010).
Notwithstanding, there is a widespread belief that developed states are unlikely to engage
in cyber warfare as these states hold similar vulnerabilities and capabilities. Realistically,
the threat of cyber warfare is more likely to occur from emerging states and non-state
actors (Schmitt, 1999). While the immediate threat may lie in small scale adventurism,
the possible repercussions of large scale cyber warfare makes limiting its scope under
international law a necessity.
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One potential source for limiting cyber warfare can be found in the just war
theory. The just war theory is based on the paradox that, at times, it is necessary to kill to
save lives (Williams, 2006). Walzer’s (2000) work on the ethics of war in his
interpretation of the just war theory revolve around the concepts of jus ad bellum, jus in
bello, and more recently, jus post bellum. With these three concepts, the legality of a
conflict is determinable by the justifications that lead to the decision to go to war, the
actions committed during the conflict, and the conduct of combatants after the end of
hostilities (Williams, 2006). These criteria are the basis for further evaluation of the
legality of cyber warfare and served as a potential source for justifying its limitation
within the context of this study. A specific issue that is addressed by the just war theory
is attributing the appropriateness of the decision to go to war. Primoratz (2002) stated
that there are wars where both parties are fighting for an unjust cause; wars where one
side is fighting for a just cause and the other an unjust cause; but none where both parties
are fighting for a just cause. Ultimately, any endorsement of the use of cyber warfare
will have to meet the criteria of a just war.
Somehow, cyber warfare slips through the net of the just war theory and proves to
be quite difficult to regulate using old, traditional ethical principles (Taddeo, 2013).
Cyber warfare has been under evaluated by traditional morality and the laws of war.
Most of the studies conducted in this area were done by computer scientists rather than
moral theorists (Dipert, 2010). In fact, the closest analogy to limiting cyber warfare
under international law may be the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972
which banned the use of biological weapons on agricultural products (Whitby, 2002).
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The unique nature of cyber warfare leaves traditional concepts within international laws
of war such as perfidy, attribution, neutrality, and sovereignty unaddressed or improperly
so. This ambiguity requires that greater attention be paid to the field of cyber warfare,
which this research attempts to accomplish. In doing so, this study may aid in reforming
the laws of war associated with cyber warfare.
Statement of the Problem
Despite the growth in cyber warfare capabilities, international law has failed to
keep up with these new realities leaving the application of law ambiguous or even
nonexistent (Schapp, 2009). Various international organizations have held conferences
on the topic of cyber warfare including the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, but few concrete results have emerged (Kanuck, 2010). The
unique nature of cyber warfare makes regulation under international law problematic
(Waxman, 2011). Simply defining cyber attacks would require an expansion of the
accepted definition of use of force while a failure to do so would leave some aspects
outside the scope of any agreed upon international law (Barkham, 2001). Additionally,
variations in legal traditions and strategic interests among leading powers limit their
ability to come to a consensus (Waxman, 2011). Because of this, the Congressional
Research Service stated that it was unlikely that the international community would be
able to reach consensus on an applicable cyber warfare law (Hildreth, 2001).
The lack of clear regulation of cyber warfare under international law may provide
states and non-state agents an opportunity to exploit the lack precedence and commit acts
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of war or provoke one through their actions. A recent example of this occurred sometime
before 2010 when a computer virus, later named Stuxnet, was developed and deployed
against an Iranian nuclear facility. The virus appears to have had two purposes. First, it
caused centrifuges used in the enrichment process to constantly change rotational speeds,
which resulted in the centrifuges destroying themselves. Second, it sent signals to plant
technicians masking the pending operational failure of the centrifuges. As the Stuxnet
attack demonstrates, the lack of legal standing covering the use of computer viruses on
commercial interests has become a more significant issue in recent years (Richmond,
2012). In order to address this problem, it is necessary to know more about the legal
standing of information warfare under international law. This study provides a better
understanding of the current state of international law regarding cyber warfare and where
gaps in the law exist that may need to be addressed. The specific problem that is
addressed is the potential for loss of life and property due to the ambiguity of
international laws covering cyber warfare.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to reach a consensus as to the current standing of
cyber warfare under international law and to recommend changes to the law as needed.
Traditionally, international law has developed from customary law, which is based on the
actions of states. Although customary law still plays a major role today, negotiated
treaties, decisions of international courts, and the actions of international organizations
are also taken into consideration (Malanczuk, 1997). Because of the destructive potential
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of cyber warfare it is inadequate to allow for the development of legal limitations under
customary law because of the length of time this has traditionally required.
This research consisted of a qualitative analysis using the Delphi method of
inquiry. The use of the Delphi method was appropriate as it allowed each participant to
refine their responses based on the input provided by other participants. These reviews
occured as the results of the previous round of questioning were provided to the
participants in subsequent rounds, a process described by Skulmoski (2007). By using
multiple iterations of inquiry with scholars in the field of cyber warfare and international
law, a consensus was reached in a number of areas as to the current standing of cyber
warfare under international law. The results of this research may be used as background
for the development of an effective cyber warfare limiting regime.
Research Questions
The research questions were:
1. At what point do computer virus attacks elevate to the level of use of force or
armed attack under international law?
2. What limitations in targeting exist with initial and reprisal cyber attacks?
3. How does the unique nature of cyber warfare affect the concept of neutrality?
4. What impediments currently exist in the development of legal limitations on
cyber warfare?
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study is based on Walzer’s modern adaptation
of the just war theory. Walzer (2000) theorized that the decision to go to war, jus ad

7
bellum, and actions during armed conflict, jus in bello, constitute legal and illegal acts of
war based on the morality of these conditions. Because of this, criteria such as the
defensive or offensive nature of the conflict, the composition of combatants, and the
effect on the civilian population are of paramount importance when determining the
justification for going to war. The protection of civilians, who are presupposed to be
immune from attack, weighs especially heavy on just war theorists when determining the
moral legality of war efforts. Modern international law does not yet specifically address
many aspects of cyber warfare. The use of the just war theory may provide insight into
future trends in the development of international agreements or the applicability of
existing international laws to cyber warfare.
The just war theory is primarily concerned with limiting casualties and
unnecessary damage during military engagements (Taddeo, 2013) making it suitable for
utilization in this study. A principal focus of the just war theory is determining the
legality of conduct during a conflict. This focus gives it applicability when determining
whether an action has triggered a use of force designation and whether an act has violated
the laws of war. Additionally, modern international law has been engrossed with
humanitarian law as a source of legal development. Using the ethical standards of the
just war theory may go a long way in determining how an international convention
dealing with cyber warfare may develop. Lastly, the application of the just war theory in
cyber warfare has been less than extensive. Utilizing the just war theory in this study
adds to the existing body of literature and helps to fill existing gaps. A more in-depth
review of the just war theory is included as part of the literature review in Chapter 2.
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Nature of the Study
For this study, a Delphi method of qualitative inquiry was utilized in an attempt to
find consensus among scholars as to the current legal standing of cyber warfare under
international law. The use of the Delphi method was appropriate for this research
specifically because of its utilization of multiple rounds of inquiry. This allowed the
study to continue until consensus was reached among the participants (Hsu & Sandford,
2007) or until it became obvious that a consensus could not be reached. Based on the
results of other Delphi studies it was expected that three rounds of inquiry would be
sufficient (Custer, Scarcella, & Stewart, 1999) to reach these results, which it was.
Additionally, as the Delphi method is designed for one-on-one investigation it allowed
for more accurate assessments by respondents compared to those that would have been
available in a group setting (Rowe, Wright, & Bulger, 1991).
The first round of inquiry consisted of a written questionnaire containing openended questions that afforded the contributors great latitude in their responses. Data
analysis at the end of the first round consisted of conventional content analysis which
took both the content and contextual meanings of responses and classifying them into
meaningful categories (Weber, 1990). Content analysis may be used to describe a
phenomenon that has not been extensively researched and aids in gathering data without
preconceived notions (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) making it ideal for this study. The
categories identified in this research were then used to identify themes for subsequent
rounds of questioning. Successive rounds of inquiry utilize questions narrowed based on
previous responses and scored by the participant’s use of a Likert-type 7-point scale. For
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this study, consensus among the participants was based on scores for a minimum of 80%
of the participants being within 2 categories on the 7-point scale as recommended by
Ulschak (1983). The specific data collection and analysis procedures employed are
described in more detail in Chapter 3 of this study.
With a Delphi study, it is recommended that researchers should use no less than
10 participants (Delbecq, Van De Ven, & Gustafson, 1975). Based on this
recommendation this study commenced with 18 participants and concluded with 16
remaining. Participants were selected based on their contributions to scholarly research
in the areas of international law and cyber warfare. Additional solicitations were made to
individuals referred by the original pool of participants through the use of snowball
sampling. The utilization of snowball sampling allows for identifying hidden populations
(Sommers, 2011) which provided an opportunity to include appropriate professionals in
this study who had not been previously recognized.
Definitions
Caroline standard: A legal determinate with which to judge the legality of preemptive military action based on necessity and proportionality (Condron, 2007).
Cyber warfare: The use of electronic means to attack and defend computerized
systems and networks (Billo, 2004).
International law: The rules, principles, and decision making processes pertaining to
the conduct between states and international organizations (Higgins, 1994).
Jus ad bellum: Latin for “right to war.” A set of principles used to determine the
legality of justification that led to the decision to go to war (Stahn, 2007).
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Jus cogens: Latin for “compelling law.” The principles of international law adopted
based on accepted norms (Stahn, 2007).
Jus in bello: Latin for “justice during war.” A set of humanitarian principles used to
determine the legality of state practices during armed conflict (Stahn, 2007).
Jus post bellum: Latin for “justice after war.” A set of principles governing
peacemaking efforts after the end of hostilities (Stahn, 2007).
Opinio juris: Latin for “an opinion of law.” The belief of a state that it has a legal
obligation to act in a specific manner (Byers, 1995).
Payload: The actual data of a computer file. Within malicious software it consists of
destructive, spurious, or insulating computer code (Computer Language Company, 2015).
Assumptions, Scope, Limitations, and Delimitations
The fundamental assumption of this research, which is necessary for gauging its
validity, is that I have correctly identified the appropriate participants. The primary
qualification for participation in the study was the contributors’ knowledge and
experience in the area of study as explained by Abrams (2010) which, in this case, was
international law and cyber warfare. Purposive sampling in the form of an extensive
review of existing scholarly literature was used to identify authors who could serve as
participants in this study. The use of snowball sampling allowed for additional
contributors to be included through peer-referral.
Purposive sampling requires researchers to exercise their own best judgment as to
whom should serve as part of the representative subset of the population based on their
shared common experiences (Abrams, 2010). For this study, the assumption was made
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that the recruitment of participants based on an extensive literature review and the
recommendations of these authors through snowball sampling sufficiently represented the
population subset. Additionally, qualitative research often seeks out atypical cases
simply because of their unique insights (Miles, 1994). Because of this, it is not only
relevant but potentially valuable that some of the participants may have represented the
fringe of the population group.
The scope of this study was initially delimited to those participants with
backgrounds in academia and research scholarship. Additional contributors included
industry and legal professionals based on the results of snowball sampling. Further
delimitation occurred in that this study focused on computer virus attacks rather than all
methods of cyber warfare. This delimitation was necessary in order to narrow the scope
from the broad range of techniques, technologies, and results that constitute cyber
warfare.
A number of limitations occurred with this study, chief of which was the level of
participation. The willingness of selected interviewees to participate cannot be accurately
predicted nor can their inclinations or abilities to remain involved for the duration of the
research (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). Because of this, it became necessary to invite 48
individuals to participate and begin the study only after more than 15 had agreed to
participate. This number was reached based on my belief that a sampling of this size
would see at least 10 participants complete each round of inquiry. In the end, the study
began with 18 participants and included at least 16 respondents for each round of inquiry.
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Another potential limitation lay with the method of inquiry utilized and the
possibility of bias. The use of a qualitative study requires the interpretation of collected
data and, therefore, may be exposed to inaccurate extrapolations. This is especially
problematic when factoring in potential researcher bias and the probability that being
privy to all participants’ responses in the earlier rounds of questioning may influence
responses in future rounds (Altschuld, 1995). In order to mitigate the possibility of
researcher bias, each participant was provided with a summary of results after each round
of inquiry to allow for corrections and revisions.
Transferability serves an important role in the development of generalizations by
the reader and, therefore, also qualifies as a limitation. This is because some researchers
believe that qualitative methods lack application outside of their original context.
Transferability is primarily the responsibility of the researcher through the construction
of an exhaustive description of the research as well as a thorough analysis of the
necessity and accuracy of assumptions made. Understanding the setting of the research,
knowledge that the sample population was of sufficient size and variety, and other
detailed information about the study will allow readers to make more appropriate
generalizations and may also allow for transferability to their own studies (Trochim,
2007). To meet the transferability requirement, a thorough description of the methods
and assumptions are provided in Chapter 3.
Significance of the Study
This study, helps fill a gap in the existing literature illustrating the lack of
international norms, standards, and legal codification of cyber warfare. It also addresses
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a gap as to the rights and limitations of states to respond to an act of cyber warfare. With
an ever growing threat of cyber warfare serving as the battleground for proxy wars in the
future, the protection of civilian industry and infrastructure during times of declared and
undeclared conflicts need to be taken into account. This accounting can only take place
after the legal standing of cyber warfare and its limitations can be ascertained.
With the results presented here, this study adds to the existing literature by
showing where current international laws lack applicability, allowing for revision and
greater coverage, and where their applicability already exists. This study may also serve
as a vehicle for further research and as a catalyst towards increased academic and
political debate over the need for revisions to the laws of war. In doing so, the negative
repercussions on civilian populations during cyber conflicts and the proceeding
reconstruction periods may be further minimized.
Summary
As with many technological advancements, the creation of cyberspace has had
both practical peaceful and military applications. Civilian industry, private citizens,
national infrastructure, and government agencies all find themselves accessible in the
same cyberspace. This interconnectivity has served as an effective tool to increase
efficiency, productivity, and the flow of ideas but, it has also created vulnerabilities to be
exploited by state and non-state actors. Cyberspace is particularly susceptible to military
exploitation because of the absence of appropriate international agreements as to the
legality and standing of cyber warfare (Dipert, 2010). Through the application of the
Delphi method of inquiry, and the use of the just war theory as a theoretical framework,
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this study provides greater understanding of specific issues of legal absence and their
possible future redresses.
In the following chapter, I provide an exhaustive literature review of scholarly
works related to international law and cyber warfare. Chapter 3 follows the literature
review and contains a detailed description of the methodology used for this study. The
results of the research are presented in Chapter 4 and are followed by a summary of the
study, drawn conclusions, and recommendations for further research in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
In this literature review, I demonstrate that despite the increased development of
cyber warfare capabilities the international community has been unable, or unwilling, to
expand the laws of war to encompass cyber warfare operations. In it, I further show that
the focuses of most scholarly evaluations of cyber warfare have addressed only a specific
aspect or two of the law or its applicability. In this chapter, divergent applications and
scholarly views are pulled into a singular document to better address the issues of cyber
warfare and the questions surrounding it legality. The literature review begins with a
concise explanation of research strategies used in locating articles and to aid continuing
research. From there, various concepts in international law are explored as well as their
possible application in cyber warfare. These concepts include the laws of war,
international humanitarian law, state sovereignty and neutrality, and ethical approaches to
warfare.
With the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the international
community recognized the nation-state as its principal entity. In doing so, the
sovereignty of these nation-states became the chief factor in determining the early
interpretations of use of force under international law (Best, 1983). Beginning in the
Nineteenth Century, a shift occurred whereby states began to recognize the importance
and usefulness of forgoing some measure of sovereignty in order to provide for greater
international cooperation and stability (Jensen, 2002). This trend means that any future
international agreement limiting the tools or scope of cyber warfare will require common
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ground and agreement among a majority of states including those that have developed
significant cyber warfare means.
Today, states throughout the world still view cyber jurisdiction as a matter of state
sovereignty, domestic legal purview, and an issue for bilateral or multilateral agreement
(Wilske, 1997). This leaves the physical location of the aggressor, victims, and the
means of attack of central importance in making jurisdictional determinations (Flanagan,
2005). When the infrastructure and actors fall under a single jurisdiction or within an
agreed upon jurisdiction, sovereign authority is exercisable leaving transnational action
and questions of extraterritoriality in defense of national interests open to interpretation
(Cassese, 2005). In 2006, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization reinforced its members’
belief in national sovereignty over cyberspace declaring their right to manage cyberspace
in accordance with each states own domestic legislation (Kanuck, 2010). This shows that
states, including cyber warriors Russia and China, currently do not recognize the nonterritoriality of the Internet or its associated equipment further minimizing the possibility
of shared governance over cyberspace in the near future.
The unique nature of cyber warfare capabilities creates new challenges to
traditional concepts in state sovereignty and the laws of war. The standards used to
separate armed attack from use of force have traditionally been based on the physical
effects of the action (Schmitt, 1999) making it problematic to judge a cyber attack by
conventional means (Jurich, 2008). The law assumes that an attack will have physical
limitations in time and space, and the effects of any attack will be visible within these
confines (Rho, 2007) but, this assumption does not remain valid in cyberspace (Jurich,
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2008). Cyber warfare may involve actions that go undetected for a considerable amount
of time or that cause no physical or irreversible damage. Because of this what has
traditionally been accepted as an armed attack or use of force will have to be reevaluated
to take into consideration the distinctive traits of cyber warfare.
Research Strategies
To complete the literature review, I used numerous sources to find scholarly
articles. The primary sources I utilized included the Walden University library system,
Google Scholar, Lexis Nexis, and the EBSCO host database. The primary keywords used
included cyber warfare, information operations, international law, just war theory and
ethics. Additional sources were located by reviewing the references of those articles
found using these techniques. Authors whose names reoccurred as sources in the
references of these articles were then further researched to allow for a more
comprehensive review of their works.
Theoretical Foundation
Any addition to the existing laws of war to include cyber warfare will most likely
be based on philosophical grounds. One potential philosophical base may be found in the
just war theory. The just war theory has developed as a tradition of thought based on
core philosophical beliefs rather than a singular doctrine (Forge, 2008). Specifically,
under the just war theory, armed conflict is permissible only when the duty to act towards
a just goal cannot be achieved without violating the duty not to injure or kill (Baer, 2005).
This does not limit states to defensive postures as numerous theorists have allowed for a
narrowly defined right of intervention (Primoratz, 2002). Dilbert (2009) expanded on
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this idea stating that preemptive attacks can be morally justified if the evidence exceeds a
90% likelihood of armed attack and that the provocation is expected to cause a high
degree of damage. While a state may make a good faith assessment that the requisite
factors for intervention or preemptive strike exist, these assessments may not meet the
demands of the international community. This may stem from a difference of opinion or
an inability to release intelligence data used to make the assessment without
compromising sources or techniques.
In a broader sense, the just war theory is concerned with human rights and the
protection of the individual during times of war. Wide recognition of the concept of
human rights among theorists has led to the development of a cosmopolitan ethos which
is based on commonly accepted ethical principles (Charvet, 1998). Cosmopolitan ethics
has continued to develop in the last few decades towards an individual-centered ethos at
the expense of the state. It proclaims that states only have those rights that serve the
interest of the individual and that these states must respect the rights of all individuals
equally regardless of their group affiliation or citizenship (Fabre, 2008). Based on
cosmopolitan ethics, the individual has become the fundamental unit of concern with all
individuals being held as equals. For just war theorists, this means there is no
differentiating between sides during a conflict as civilians on all sides should enjoy the
same protections.
While just war theorists are concerned with protecting civilians during times of
conflict, they recognize that some civilians are not innocent. Walzer (2000) stated that
civilians engaged in the business of war lose their protections and become legitimate
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military targets. This can only occur when the individual forfeits their protections by
their own action (Primoratz, 2002). This forfeiture is only accomplishable in one of three
ways; by joining the military, by serving as a senior political leader, or by being
employed in a military industry directly serving the war effort such as a munitions factory
(Walzer, 2000). Some scholars, such as Green (1992), have criticized Walzer’s blanket
amnesty for civilian responsibility in the decision to pursue armed conflict and especially
those living in democratic states. Other scholars find fault with civilians who do not
actively oppose their government’s pursuit of an unjust war labeling it passive support.
Even though these scholars do not necessarily recognize the innocence of all
noncombatants most still typically extend special protections to civilians during times of
war (Primoratz, 2002). The question over who represents a legitimate target will play an
important role in determining the legitimacy of cyber warfare.
An argument exists that cyber warfare is both potentially the most dangerous and
the least comprehensively evaluated military technology from an ethical standpoint.
Some scholars believe that technologies that make it easier to act in a destructive manner
are more likely to be employed (Lucas, 2010). The defense industry’s research and
development of weapon systems is done within the restrains of military ethics and
international law. Conversely, those who develop cyber warfare means are working
primarily in software and are not as constrained as those that work in the traditional
military complex (Perry, 2009). This has led some scholars to draw a correlation
between the more indiscriminate planning of operations against civilian infrastructure
within the cyber warfare community when compared to that of their counterparts in
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traditional defense fields (Lucas, 2010). This adds an additional concern in the protection
of non-combatants as the targeting of civilian infrastructure may increase causalities
among civilians.
Contemporary just war theories have taken into account the costs and benefits of
war when evaluating the legitimacy of armed conflicts. The problem that has vexed these
theorists is how to measure cost and benefit against each other when the cost is unknown.
This is of particular concern with weapons innovation as the current cost may be known,
but continued justification into the future is not fathomable. Future cost might be
indeterminable simply because of situational or technological changes, (Forge, 2008) or
because interdependencies may cause unforeseeable indirect damage (Borg, 2005). Even
with these potential problems the condemnation of cyber warfare is not universal even
among those who have shown a propensity to deem it unethical or illegal. Rowe (2009)
has recognized and commended some cyber tactics for their ability to damage a structure
temporarily and in a reversible fashion which otherwise would have been destroyed had
they been the target of a kinetic attack.
The majority of cyber weapons will most likely fail to achieve their intended
result (Rowe, 2009). This stems from the fact that cyber weapons are more prone to
system failures than traditional military weapons (Neumann, 1995), they may not find
their intended targets, or they are ineffective because the target is not, or no longer,
vulnerable to the weapon (Rowe, 2009). Cyber weapons, like all new weapons, have a
high error rate (Dunnigan, 2003; Rowe, 2009). The fact that, while conventional
weapons tend to improve, cyber weapon software is generally no more reliable today than
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in the past further exasperates this problem (Neumann, 1995; Rowe, 2009). Additionally,
cyber weapons most likely can only be used effectively once as after they produce the
desired effect computer-forensic experts can typically determine what happened and
devise protections against it in the future (Ranum, 2004). These realities cause
potentially unreliable and uncontrollable weapons to be consistently developed and
deployed leading to an endless cycle of collateral damage. For just war theorists, this
will be a significant concern and a fundamental determinate in their evaluation of cyber
warfare.
For the purposes of this study it was determined that the use of the just war theory
may help define the future of cyber warfare legislation, however, some experts would
disagree. Dipert (2006) saw both the just war theory and international law as inadequate
to evaluate cyber warfare tactics either morally or legally. As with aviation and seafaring,
cyber warfare operates in a realm whose focus are both military and non-military, with
the boundary between the two problematic to demark. Because of this, some scholars
believe it is difficult to properly determine the military aspects of cyber warfare within
the current confines of either the just war theory or international law (Lucas, 2010).
Review of Literature
Defining Cyber Warfare
Cyber warfare includes both offensive and defensive computer technologies and
their associated components, infrastructure, organizations and personnel (Jurich, 2008).
Offensive tactics in cyber warfare can take one of two approaches: cyber attack, which
causes some level of destruction and cyber exploitation, which in non-destructive and
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would ideally go undetected such as obtaining information covertly through the use of
Trojan Horse software. While different in their end roles, both forms require a
vulnerability in the target, the ability to access the vulnerability, and a payload with
which to execute. The vulnerability to be exploited most likely occurred as a design or
implementation flaw but may have been intentionally created as a necessary aspect of the
computer program. Ingress to the vulnerability may be done by remote access at a
distance or by close access, which typically requires physical contact with the automated
system being attacked (Lin, 2010). For the purposes of this research, only cyber attacks
will be addressed as they are the only approach that is potentially deadly or destructive
and, therefore, conceivably governable by the laws of war.
Cyber attacks are typically designed to cause problems with the integrity,
authenticity, or availability of a computerized system or its data. Attacks on the integrity
of a system need not cause the entire system to become inoperable, but instead could
merely cause the system to respond in an atypical fashion. The most common method of
performing a system integrity attack would utilize the destruction or manipulation of key
system data. Questions of authenticity revolve around the masking of the true source of
information leaving the user to believe in its genuineness. This can occur by the attacker
being an active participant on a network generating erroneous traffic or by altering
preexisting data. Lastly, availability may be the complete disabling of a system or a
single component within it. Availability attacks often reduce functionality or deny
services on a network rather than attempt to destroy data.
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Jus Ad Bellum: The Laws of War
The United Nations Charter consists of the terms use of force, threat of force, and
armed attack without clearly defining what each entails. Instead, states have relied on
historical precedence and now recognize actions such as forms of economic and political
coercion as unfriendly acts but not worthy of being elevated to the level of use of force,
threat of force, or armed attack. These acts would include espionage, surveillance, denial
of communication services, boycotts, the severing of diplomatic ties and the like (Lin,
2010). The International Court of Justice ruled in Nicaragua v. The United States (1986)
that the use of force is not always tantamount to an armed attack and that the interference
of one state into the affairs of another does not always justify the recognition of the
intervention as a use of force (Jensen, 2002). Instead, the court provided three specific
conditions to justify the need for a proportional response. First, the response must be
directed against a state that has performed a wrong under international law. Second, the
responding state must have first called on the aggressor to halt their illegal conduct and
make reparations. Third, the responding state must do so in a manner proportional to the
offending state’s actions (Jensen, 2002). All three conditions have unique problems
when applied to cyber warfare and especially the first two. Cyber attacks are often
designed to mask the identity of the attacker and may not be detectable for a considerable
amount of time. Additionally, the ambiguity over the current status of cyber warfare
under international law may make it impossible to apply the court’s first and third criteria.
Although a cyber attack may violate the legal obligations of a state, it is possible
that the violation would be deemed merely a material breach of agreement rather than an
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act that warrants a right to self-defense (Kanuck, 1996). Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter recognizes the right of all states to self-defense if an armed attack occurs
(Hoisington, 2009). The use of the term armed attack seemingly raises the minimum
level of the offending action to that above a use of force (Schmitt, 1999) which does not
afford the victimized state the right to reprisal but merely retorsions such as political or
economic coercion (Jurich, 2008). This has led to an interpretative debate among
scholars with some believing that a state must wait for an armed attack to have occurred
before it invokes its right to self-defense (Barkham, 2001). Others use the Caroline
standard as the basis for a customary law which would support preemptive force against
an impending threat (Condron, 2007). Schmitt (1999) accepted the concept of
anticipatory self-defense but limits it to instances when the cyber attack is a component
of a greater armed assault, the armed assault is imminent, and the responding state has
waited to the last possible instance to counter the impending attack. In doing so, he
further explained that the counter attack must be done in response to the overall armed
attack rather than merely the cyber aspect. The question that confronts theorists today is
at what point cyber warfare elicits a right to self-defense under international law,
especially considering that cyber weapons do not meet the accepted definition of an
armed attack. This is necessary to determine whether the cyber attack is an act of war
because if it fails to meet this standard, it would seemingly not be governed under the
international laws of war.
Under jus ad bellum, a state must have proportionality, necessity, and immediacy,
in order to claim self-defense. The concept of proportionality limits the nation’s response
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to one that is the least necessary in terms of intensity, duration, and magnitude to deter
further provocation (Jensen, 2002). The victimized state must be able to identify their
attacker, as well as the attacker’s intent under the condition of necessity (Cordon, 2007).
The question of attribution is one of whether a state can lawfully respond without
conclusively knowing the identity of the attacker (Jensen, 2002). Even if the general
location an attack emanated from can be determined, there still may be questions as to
whether the perpetrator is a government agent (Schmitt, 1999). This problem is
compounded by the strong possibility that a cyber attack will use perfidy, combatants
masking their actions as genuine civilian activity, in order to avoid detection. Perfidy is
illegal under international law because it encourages attacks on civilians (Rowe, 2009), as
is the development of any weapon whose use cannot be reasonably kept with military
personnel, or whose governments cannot be held accountable for their use (Lucas, 2010).
It is necessary for states to be able to positively identify their attackers not only to avoid
targeting innocents (Condron, 2007) but also because the rules governing the use of force
are applied differently based on whether the aggressor is a state or non-state actor (Jensen,
2002). Even in conventional warfare there exists a fog whereby the identity of an
attacker may not be immediately known. With cyber warfare, this concern is greatly
magnified and is a central problem for leaders when attempting to respond to a cyber
provocation.
To meet the condition of immediacy, the response cannot occur after too much
time has passed (Cordon, 2007) but, as noted by Gill (2006), the response need not be
immediately after the initial attack. The concept of “boiling the frog” may have
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application here as it raises more questions about the requirement for immediacy. In this
analogy, a frog placed in hot water will recognize the danger of his surroundings and
jump out while a frog placed in cold water that is slowly brought to a boil will not
recognize his predicament and be cooked. Many cyber attacks are of the same nature, as
a sudden change in an automated system that has been attacked will be evident as well as
its end results. Conversely, an attack that brings on a gradual response may eventually
meet or even exceed the magnitude of the sudden change, but the results will only
become apparent well after the attack occurred (Lin, 2010). This leaves the lesser sudden
attack susceptible to a potential counterattack under the right to self-defense but the more
intense gradual attack in legal limbo.
Rather than simply settle for passive defenses such as firewalls, sensors, and
computer experts, governments are likely to develop active defenses that respond to
recognized cyber events (Kumar, 2002). One example of this is the Blitzkrieg system
which reportedly is capable of detecting and immediately responding to a cyber-born
intrusion by initiating a virus attack on the offending computer system (Denning, 1998).
To remain legal under international law, these active defensive systems would have to be
limited in capability to reflect problems with attribution and characterization of the cyber
event, as well as the neutrality of nations (Walker, 2000). The Blitzkrieg system
seemingly would violate the law due to questions of attribution and neutrality. Its
immediate response would not allow for positive identification of the attacker and its
counter strike may pass through networks that exist in neutral third-countries. As the
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Blitzkrieg system demonstrates, a lack of legal standing over cyber warfare may be
exploited to deploy such system in defense of national assets.
Traditionally, there have been two approaches when determining whether an
action justifies a use of force under international law. The first view sees international
law, and related international organizations, as having been established to keep smaller
actions from escalating into full-scale wars. Because of this they discount the method of
attack and merely weigh the actual effects of the action. The second view sees any action
other than military as legal under international law. Adherents to this approach weigh the
quality of the force rather than the quantity of it. By extension, they discourage the use
of military action while supporting diplomatic, economic, and political coercion (Sassoli,
2003). Schmitt (1998) discounted the viability of both approaches declaring that, as the
means of coercion change, the law needs to evolve to recognize the new reality.
The United Nations Charter specifically omitted defining economic or political
coercion as a use of force (Schmitt, 1999). Any attempt to classify cyber warfare as a use
of force would make it difficult not to violate this premise as cyber attacks that cause no
physical damage would have to be distinguished from acts of political and economic
coercion that have the same end effects (Barkham, 2001). Hollis (2007) sees three
possibilities for determining whether cyber warfare can ever constitute a use of force.
First, cyber warfare cannot constitute a use of force if it lacks the physical characteristics
of a traditional military attack (Kanuck, 1996). Second, cyber warfare constitutes a use
of force whenever it targets critical national infrastructure (Jensen, 2002). Lastly,
whenever a cyber attack is intended to cause a result similar to that of a traditional
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military attack (Silver, 2002). While potentially useful, these criteria may remain too
broadly defined and subject to interpretation to be the basis of a final determination as to
the nature of a cyber event. A stronger approach may be found in one that possesses
scientific application.
Models exist that were designed for more precise evaluation of state actions with
some also potentially having applicability in evaluating cyber warfare. For example,
Schmitt (1998) designed a 7-criterion tool to evaluate the actions of states through
qualitative analysis. This is to be done using any fixed quantitative scale in which to
calculate the severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, presumptive
legitimacy, and responsibility of the action. This would allow for a determination as to
whether the cyber attack has the same predictable consequences as a kinetic attack and,
therefore, meet Hollis’ third criteria. Barkham (2001) sees Schmitt’s approach as flawed
and backwards for attempting to determine the legality of an attack based on the attack
rather than the law. Conversely, numerous scholars see the effects of a cyber attack as
the suitable point to judge whether the attack may be considered a use of force rather than
the actual approach taken to deliver the attack (Schmitt, 1999). Barkham (2001) further
sees fault on the reliance of immediately assessing the attack after its occurrence as cyber
attacks often have effects unknown at the time of the event. Barkham’s last critique is of
singular importance when states find themselves under cyber attack. The use of a model,
such as proposed by Schmidt, may be effective at evaluating cyber events and state
responses to them after the engagement has occurred but, it is not a practical tool during
the event. This means state actions may be criticized, or even punished after a conflict
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has occurred although the state had no firm guidance as to the legality of potential
responses during the event.
While acts of espionage have been deemed to be below the level of use of force,
some instances of espionage utilizing military naval and air power have been categorized
as armed aggression worthy of an armed response (Scott, 1999). Lin (2010) applies this
same principle to cyber events, as while cyber exploitation is similar to espionage in
nature, the payload delivered may also contain the ability to perform a cyber attack or be
upgradeable to perform one in real time. The problem lies in the victimized state being
unable to recognize the intent of the cyber intrusion. This is especially a concern
considering that cyber exploitation and cyber attacks both start at the same point, taking
advantage of a vulnerability, but result in very different effects. Lin points out that the
situation is further complicated as some scholars believe that cyber exploitation could be
considered an act of hostile intent rising to the level of use of force. This may be possible
if an act of espionage is conducted for a considerable duration and collects a large
volume of intelligence.
Even though they have similar results, international law takes a very different
approach to economic sanctions and blockades. Economic sanctions refer to a sovereign
state exercising its legal right not to trade with another sovereign state. By contrast,
blockades have been deemed illegal as they infringe on the right of third-party states to
trade with the state subjected to the blockade. With the increasing reliance of modern
states on the Internet for commerce, cyber attacks that terminate any e-commerce
functions would have to be evaluated as either sanctions or a blockade (Lin, 2010) and,

30
therefore, a potential use of force. On the surface, it would seem more similar to a
blockade as severing e-commerce capabilities will most likely affect more states than just
the belligerents. Regardless, questions about espionage and commerce are raised under
cyber warfare that cannot be readily addressed by applying current understandings of the
law. Like much of cyber warfare, these potential tactics represent a gray area of jus ad
bellum.
Jus In Bello: International Humanitarian Law
The effectiveness of current international humanitarian law’s applicability
towards cyber warfare is a matter of some debate. Numerous governments, including the
United States, believe the current form is sufficient and have resisted efforts to include
additional legal codification (Kelsey, 2008). They are supported by scholars such as
Walker (2000) who believes the exponential growth of technology would leave any
specific cyber warfare legislation obsolete shortly after it is enacted. Other scholars take
the view that current law is difficult to apply to cyber warfare and have even called for an
international convention to be convened to resolve the issue (Brown, 2006). These views
clearly contradict. While technological growth would affect any agreed upon laws, the
same has held true for conventional warfare.
Determining whether a target constitutes a legitimate military one is a difficult
task under cyber warfare (Greenberg, 1998). The evolution of modern warfare has
challenged the traditional categorization of military and civilian targets (O’Donnell, 2003)
as acts of war no longer have the distinction of being designed to merely defeat the
enemy’s military force (Sassoli, 2003). The 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva
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Convention clarifies by declaring military targets as those that make an effective
contribution to military action or offers a definite military advantage (Kelsey, 2008).
Because of this current international law does not deem attacks against targets that do not
aid in the overall war effort, but that do have military applicability, as illegal (Brown,
2006). Civilian objects may be deemed legitimate targets if they are dual-use and have a
secondary military capability that makes an effective contribution to military action
(Sassoli, 2003). The interpretation of what makes an effective contribution, especially
among dual-use targets, is of particular importance when attempting to legally limit cyber
warfare.
There is an opinion within some segments of the military that all legal
conventional military targets are also legal cyber targets as current international
humanitarian law does not distinguish between modes of attack (Kelsey, 2008). This
may make cyber attacks more advantageous to commanders as a cyber attack may result
in less civilian collateral damage than a conventional attack (O’Donnell, 2003).
Furthermore, the belief exists that nonlethal forms of cyber warfare will be more
aggressively used, potentially leading to violations of international law, simply because
their potentially nonlethal nature blurs the legality of their use. This stems from the
conviction that the existence of nonlethal forms of cyber warfare may make it more likely
that commanders will ignore the distinction requirements of international humanitarian
law (Kelsey, 2008). This could leave purely civilian targets such as financial systems at
greater risk (O’Donnell, 2003). More likely, it will leave dual-use industries, such as
telecommunications, at risk. Cyber warfare has the potential to disrupt the activities of
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these industries without causing physical damage to them. The lack of physical damage
may allow leaders to justify them as legitimate wartime targets.
Rowe (2009) stated that the weapons and tactics most commonly arranged for in a
cyber conflict are those that target civilians, potentially causing widespread suffering and
the destruction of property. This has led him to believe that the use of cyber weapons in
their current form is in violation of the laws of armed conflict. The principal of
proportionality states that the loss of life and property related to an attack may not be
disproportionate in relation to the military advantage gained by attacking the target
(O’Donnell, 2003). This may leave some targets that are protected from conventional
attack open to cyber attack if they minimize the loss of life and property (Schmitt, 2002).
One example of this may be the targeting of the Internet itself.
The Internet began as a military project under the auspices of the Advanced
Research Programs Agency as a means to create redundant channels of communication in
the event of an attack on the United States (Walker, 2000). It has grown so quickly that
providers have had to establish a hub-and-spoke configuration throughout various cities
to handle the volume of use. This system improves operability but also leaves it more
susceptible to attack and gives the sender and receiver little control over how their
packets are transferred. With longer messages, the signal may be sent in multiple packets
and reassembled at its destination. This most likely involves each packet taking a
different path from the sender to the receiver (Kelsey, 2008). As the military relies on
public communication infrastructure for an estimated 95% of its current communication
transmissions (Intoccia, 2006), a case could be made that civilian infrastructure that sends

33
and receives Internet signals is a legitimate military target. Since it would be difficult to
determine which routes military signals are taking to their receivers, this could leave the
entire Internet susceptible to attack.
International law has intentionally avoided labeling economic coercion as an act
of war (Barkham, 2001). The 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention bans
all states from damaging or manipulating any object that has been deemed essential for
the populations’ survival such as water, livestock, and agricultural products in a manner
that makes it unavailable. The same convention also requires combatants to protect the
natural environment, man-made objects that control the forces of nature such as dams,
and other objects whose damage or destruction would contaminate the environment such
as with nuclear power stations (Kelsey, 2008). This seemingly limits the use of cyber
warfare and kinetic attack alike if the results contravened this convention. Again, the
problem may lay in the fact that cyber warfare means could disable without physical
damage these categories of targets. In theory, a nuclear power plant could be taken off
line by a cyber attack to keep it from supplying power to the military at the expense of
the civilian population it also serves.
Jus Post Bellum: The Aftermath of War
International law has recognized the need to safeguard populations when conflicts
lead to the collapse of the state’s sovereign authority. These laws are enshrined in the
Conservation Principle which prohibits substantial changes to the legal, political,
economic, or social institutions of a state by an occupying power (Cohen, 2007).
However, the degree to which humanitarian law is applicable over civilian activities after
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the secession of violence is not clear (Stahn, 2007). Furthermore, there is a disagreement
between scholars as to whether jus post bellum already exists within the rules of jus in
bello and jus ad bellum (Evans, 2005). In reality, jus post bellum is still in its infancy and
requires further development before it can be applied to any form of warfare at the same
levels as jus in bello and jus ad bellum. The debate as to whether there is even a need for
a separate jus post bellum may serve to slow the process of legal determination.
The outcome of each war differs and may end in any of a number of scenarios
ranging from surrender, occupation, regime change, armistice, transition to guerilla
resistance, and the like. Just as the outcome of each conflict differs, so do the
requirements to ensure a just peace (Williams, 2006). Under jus post bellum states that
were not party to hostilities may still be involved in post-conflict activities (Osterdahl,
2009). Contemporary jus post bellum theorists believe a just peace occurs when all those
involved in the conflict have more secure human rights than before the outbreak of
hostilities. For this to occur, the victor, and potentially states not involved in the conflict,
must restore order, rehabilitate damaged economies, restore sovereignty and selfdetermination as well as punish human rights violations that occurred during the conflict
(Williams, 2006). Contemporary theorists have also speculated whether the concept of
jus post bellum may serve as an incentive which guides how states pursue their goals
during hostilities or lead them to avoid armed conflicts entirely so as not to limit their
ability to forge a durable peace (Stahn, 2007). This may be visible in regards to cyber
warfare in that it is a violation of international law to continue hostilities against a party
that has surrendered. Cyber attacks tend to lack the necessary controls to adhere to this
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stipulation and especially when the attack impedes the necessary communication to
terminate it (Rowe, 2009). Conversely, the damage caused by cyber attacks is often
much easier to reverse, making some cyber weapons more appropriate when considering
post war operations.
While the conditions necessary to wage a just war have been debated to a
considerable length, the circumstances needed for a just peace have gone largely ignored
(Kegley, 1999). In fact, Walzer (2004) has defined it as the least developed aspect of the
just war theory. Few, if any, conventional arms have had their development limited
because of a need to more readily establish a just peace. The lack of limitations on
conventional arms will most certainly carry over to cyber warfare as military planners
and political leaders remain more focused on winning wars, rather than winning the
subsequent peace.
Customary Law
One potential source for any international laws of war covering cyber warfare
may be found in customary law. Customary international law has developed very slowly
over time which has led some to dismiss it as impractical for the formation of
international cyber law (Schmitt, 1999). The reality is that modern agreements have been
negotiated, codified, and implemented in a short span of time such as with the laws
governing outer space (Cody, 2002). More recent evaluations of customary international
law formation have focused on the realist perspective that all those bound by the law
should have some say in it. This logic would include non-state actors such as
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and even multinational
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corporations. Others have argued that many of these organizations are overly politicized
and fail to properly represent civil societies (Ochoa, 2007). Unlike conventional military
weapons, cyber weapons can be developed by all these entities and even individuals.
This means any internationally agreed upon limitation on the use of cyber attacks will
require taking these bodies into consideration. This may well lead to some of them
demanding a say in the formation of the law and standing within the regulatory regime.
Historically, states have reacted to changes in the tools and tactics of war by the
use of analogy. This has occurred by applying previous and related laws to new
situations and technologies, by developing laws and making agreements regulating or
prohibiting an act or technology, or by updating and revising existing laws and
agreements (Hollis, 2007). Traditionally, the formation of customary law has been based
on state practice and opinio juris, relying heavily on resolutions and declarations (Meron,
1996). State practice refers to the general and consistent actions of a state which forms a
precedence that can be applied to the law. Conversely, opinio juris is the belief that
states follow a set practice because of a feeling of legal obligation to do so rather than
their own views (Byers, 1995).
Some scholars have questioned the validity of the view that customary law is
based on the beliefs and actions of the state (Ochoa, 2007) while others have claimed that
the use of custom as a source in the development of international law is nearing its end
(Kelly, 2000). This view is based primarily on the belief that the nature and importance
of custom’s essential components are contentious (Roberts, 2001). At the same time, the
use of international codifications, scholarly works, and International Court of Justice case
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law have all contributed to the development of customary international law (Reisman,
1987). These seemingly contradictory viewpoints have led to opposing approaches,
which Roberts (2001) labeled traditional custom and modern custom.
Traditional custom is defined as coming from specific instances of state practice
as formulated by the state’s belief in its legal obligations. With traditional custom, opinio
juris becomes a secondary consideration. Dissimilarly, modern custom emphasizes
opinio juris and general statements rather than actual practice (Roberts, 2001). Because
traditional custom is based on actual practice it may better represent the actual views of
the international community and, therefore, represent the way forward for the formation
of laws limiting cyber warfare. The problem lies in the lack of precedence setting
national policies in regards to cyber warfare. For the most part, states have intentionally
failed to limit their cyber capabilities and have even made contradictory statements over
their policy beliefs.
Differences between modern and traditional custom are also apparent in their
development, as the former could progress rapidly while the latter would move slower
through an inductive process. These differences would allow for different tests and
justifications of their utility (Henkin, 1996). Traditional custom has been further
criticized as inappropriate for the development of international customary law because of
the increased number and diversity of states, as well as the amplified role that
international forums play in addressing issues (Charney, 1993). This seemingly serves
the interests of a small group of powerful states (Reisman, 1987) and may lead to laws
that lack true legitimacy as they would be based on little or even conflicting state
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practices (Weisburd, 1988). Modern custom is criticized as actually being an offshoot of
universal declaratory law, rather than an evolution in customary international law. The
premise of this idea is that modern custom develops through statements of practice,
whether or not they are believed by the formulating state, and not through an analysis of
regular state behavior (Bodansky, 1995). Because of the disagreements over the
development of custom the utilization of a traditional or modern approach and, therefore,
between opinio juris or state practice, may well lie in the actual activity being legislated
and the reasonableness of the law. This concept is supported by the interpretive theory of
law which seeks equilibrium between what laws have been and what they should be
(Roberts, 2001).
While the utilization of battlefield and operational practices have gone largely
ignored in the development of customary international law (Meron, 1996), the Agreement
on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities negotiated between the United States
and the Soviet Union may set precedence for the development of just such a customary
law. With this agreement the two parties forbade the interference of command and
control systems which would otherwise be a legitimate target under the existing laws of
war (Barkham, 2001). This agreement notwithstanding, states are unlikely to limit the
use of cyber weapons under international agreement because they could offer the benefit
of non-lethal attack, and the full extent of their potential is unknown (Ellis, 2001). This
may mean that states will not choose to limit cyber weapons until after they have
deployed them and tested their potential in a real-world conflict (Kelsey, 2008).
Regardless, precedence setting bilateral agreements like the Agreement on the Prevention
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of Dangerous Military Activities may serve as a principal contributor to the establishment
of a customary law covering cyber warfare in the future.
A Global Common in Cyberspace
Cyberspace has become an integral and integrated aspect of the global economy
and human interaction. Based on this, the belief that cyberspace should be defined and
managed under the guise of a global common, not unlike the high seas, Antarctica, and
outer space has recently emerged. The difference here is two-fold; first, the established
areas of global commons are natural formations and not an invention conceived by
human beings. Second, current attitudes recognize national sovereignty over cyberspace
whereas sovereignty over the existing global commons was never previously established.
These means that arbitrators would be required to rule in cases of national sovereignty
over cyberspace, but only after the extent of the global common had been established.
This, in turn, would be possible only after international norms and standards over both
jurisdictions and behavior in relation to cyberspace are established (Kanuck, 2010).
The use of wireless technologies further complicates the recognition and
application of sovereign jurisdiction. One related example deals with the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) which is charged with allocating electromagnetic
frequencies and enforcing a ban on unauthorized usage. The government of Cuba has
used the ITU mandate to unsuccessfully charge the United States with violating its
national sovereignty because of unauthorized, anti-regime television and radio broadcasts
emanating from south Florida (Kanuck, 2010). The inability of the ITU to successfully
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adjudicate the Cuban complaint shows that similar complaints over cyberspace may well
suffer from a similar lack of authoritative controls.
Physical areas and resources that are designated global commons are done so
based primarily on the scarcity of the resource, developing technologies, and the
maintenance of access. This is particularly true with advancements in technology that
lead to overuse and, therefore, man-made scarcities. The principal function of global
common governing bodies, which are established by treaty signatories to oversee the
proper implementation of the treaty’s statutes, is not to assign rights but to regulate
behavior in order to avoid such scarcities (Vogler, 2012). This occurs when states join
regulatory regimes and adhere to their tenants specifically because they represent the
minimum direction over their activities that they are willing to accept (Underdal, 1980).
One example of global common governance can be found in the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, otherwise known as the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967. This treaty currently consists of 101 state parties and 89 state signatories
(Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, 1967). It requires states to consult with the other signatories prior to
introducing anything into outer space that would interfere with its peaceful exploration or
use (Hollis, 2007). As with this treaty, most successful global commons regimes are
founded on a system of mutual interdependence that exacts adherence through a form of
peer pressure rather than sanctions (Vogler, 2012). Based on this example, any cyber
global common would likely have similar constraints on military usage. In doing so, the
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deployment, but not necessarily the development, of cyber weapons would be considered
a material breach of agreement but not a violation of international law. Depending on the
nature of pressures allotted to the regulatory regime a global common designation for
cyberspace would probably do little by itself to limit cyber warfare.
Unlike previous commons, cyberspace is a unique mixture of that which should
be private, public, and under shared governance. Additionally, it exists in a nonfigurative
world of ideas and information (Lukasik, 2000). As with most emerging technologies,
differences appear between those technologies and the global commons. First, while
distribution may be global, as in the case of cyberspace, it is not done systematically or
equitably. The development of new technologies is also irreversible and inevitably leads
to advancements that ultimately create new realities. This makes it necessary to
anticipate areas of growth, forestall the risks involved, and adjust regulations accordingly
before the global common shows any effects. Stern (2011) concludes that this problem is
exasperated by global conflicts of interest, conflicts in values, and questions about the
legitimacy of policies considering that governance is normally done by elites who are
advised by technical experts.
Because of the dynamic nature of network technologies any treaty would require
constant revision, which again separates cyberspace from the existing global commons.
As new technologies are typically concentrated into increasingly fewer hands, rivalries
among states and differences of opinion may hamper the necessary revision of the treaty.
Lacking any real motivation to revise treaty standards to limit their utilization of these
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emerging technologies, it is unlikely that the appropriate treaty revisions will occur in a
timely fashion.
Neutrality in Cyberspace
The Hague Convention V states that warring parties may not move weaponry or
military supplies, including air units, across the territory of a neutral state. The only
exception to this rule is that naval units may pass through a neutral state’s territorial
waters, but may not commit a hostile act while present there. Additionally, neutral states
are required to resist any attempts at violating their territorial sovereignty (Kelsey, 2008).
Some scholars see the use of cyber weapons as violating neutrality as the weapons are
moved across the territory of neutral states through the use of their communication
systems (Greenberg, 1998). Brown (2006) also supports this belief by recognizing a
distinction between the sending of military communication, which does not violate
neutrality, and cyber weapons.
According to Hague Convention V neutral nations have no obligation to deny
access to any of their publicly accessible communications equipment even in the event of
an international conflict. This is contingent on them applying any chosen action equally
and impartially as failure to do so would cause them to forfeit their neutrality. These
stipulations are only enforceable in times of armed conflict and, therefore, are not
applicable to cyber events that do not rise to the level of use of force (Jensen, 2002).
However, whether Hague Convention V applies only to communication networks but
also digital systems that are capable of creating data rather than merely relaying it is a
matter of some contention (Kelsey, 2008). This dispute is an important one as military

43
communications can be carried by both means, but cyber attacks that employ weapons
such as computer viruses are only possible using digital systems.
The primary purpose for a neutral designation is to protect noncombatant states
from becoming involved in a conflict against their will. Even with this designation a
neutral state may be drawn into the conflict based on their inaction. If a neutral state in
unwilling or unable to halt the use of its territory for the military benefit of one of more
combatants, the other belligerents may attack the enemy within the neutral state’s
sovereign territory (Jensen, 2002). The neutral state than may invoke a right to selfdefense (Walker, 2000) pulling increasingly more states into a wider war. It is more
likely that the state victimized by the cyber attack will retaliate by using the
communication networks of neutral states to launch a cyber attack of their own (Kelsey,
2008). This scenario would risk expanding the conflict beyond its original belligerents
and encompass a wider war, but only if the use of networks in neutral countries can be
considered a military benefit. This seems unlikely because the redundancy of Internet
routing theoretically would require the severing of digital communications passing
through all neutral countries. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the
ability of a neutral state to detect a malicious packet and prevent their passage through its
communication network is very limited short of severing all outside communications
(Brown, 2006). This would be an unreasonable burden on civilian and non-threatening
military communications and adds yet another point of contention over the role of
neutrality in cyber conflicts.
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Despite the problems cyber attacks afford to the traditional notion of state
neutrality, it should be noted that there is the belief that the concept of neutrality does not
exist in an armed conflicts when the use of force has been authorized by the United
Nations Security Council to maintain or restore the peace (Huang, 2009). This
designation would have the same effect on a cyber conflict if, and when, the use of cyber
weapons is legally recognized as an armed attack.
Summary
While tenets of jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum may have
applicability to cyber warfare, international law does not yet specifically address this
possibility nor has it developed laws that acknowledge the unique nature of combat that
cyber warfare presents. Further complicating the expansion of international law to
incorporate cyber warfare is that established concepts, such as state neutrality, are blurred
by the technologies utilized to wage war in cyberspace. Additionally, cyberspace holds
some of the same properties as established global commons, such as outer space and the
high seas, which would have to be taken into account when attempting to regulate cyber
warfare.
International law has developed primarily under customary law but, with cyber
warfare in its infancy, states have yet to develop clear policies on its uses and appear to
be reluctant to do so until the capabilities of cyber warfare can be fully understood.
Historically, the existing laws of war have been applied to new weapon systems and
methods but the unique nature of cyber warfare makes this difficult. Because of this it
may be necessary to develop new laws rather than attempt to apply existing laws to some
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aspects of cyber warfare. One possible philosophical basis in the development of a new
cyber warfare convention may be found in the just war theory, and the emphasis it places
on human rights. By evaluating cyber warfare against the ethical standards of war
developed under the just war theory, it may be possible to get a clearer picture of what is
needed to ensure that cyber warfare does not lead to the same excesses that are currently
banned under traditional warfare.
In the following chapter, I describe the research method used including the
research questions, data processes and procedures, as well as commentaries on data
verifications and limitations of the study.
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Chapter 3: Research Methods
Introduction
In the previous chapter, the current literature on the laws of war and the historical
development of international law were described. Additionally, in it a gap was shown in
the literature regarding the legal standing of, or any definitive applicability of current
international law, in the area of cyber warfare. In an attempt to understand the current
legal context and provide recommendations for development of more adequate
protections, this study sought out the knowledge and opinions of recognized experts in
the fields of international law and cyber warfare. This chapter describes the qualitative
research method and design used in an attempt to obtain a consensus among these
scholars as to the standing of cyber warfare under international law.
Research Design and Methodology
To better clarify the legal standing of cyber warfare under international law, this
study employed a method of inquiry utilizing the Delphi technique. O’Sullivan, Rassel,
and Berner (2003) contended that qualitative methods are appropriate for research that
produces data that are difficult or impossible to express numerically such as the replies to
open-ended questions. This method allowed for the asking of initial open-ended
questions, interpretation of the responses, and preparation of follow-up questions (Caudle,
1994) so as to find themes and concepts in the data (O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2003).
This approach is necessary for studies such as the one presented here where variables are
difficult to discover or to measure accurately (Creswell, 2007). Because of the lack of
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previous investigation into this topic, it was difficult to determine any variables to
examine at the onset of this study.
The Delphi method is principally applicable for studies that require structured and
organized group communication (Powell, 2003). Unlike other qualitative research
methods, the Delphi technique utilizes multiple iterations to allow for the development of
consensus in regards to a specified topic (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). This is especially
important for a topic that is lacking in empirical evidence (Delbecq, Van De Ven, &
Gustafson, 1975) as the feedback each participant receives from the researcher between
rounds may increase the level of participation and discovery of new ideas (Pill, 1971).
The Delphi technique’s ability to combine the knowledge of the research subjects is ideal
for a study of the interpretation of international laws and their applicability towards cyber
warfare.
Originally, other methods and techniques of inquiry were investigated and
considered for this study but ultimately deemed to be less effective in providing the
desired outcome. One method examined was the use of a grounded theory study which
attempts to develop a theory based on the results of a single round of interviews with
enough participants to saturate a data category (Creswell, 2007). This approach was
dismissed because a single round of interviews would most likely not have provided
adequate data to reach a consensus of opinion. This is especially true in that a first round
of questioning was required for this study to discover the themes needing to be explored
further. This assumption proved accurate as subsequent rounds of questioning were
necessary to develop an understanding of the topic and reach a consensus among the
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participants. Furthermore, the topic most likely did not lend to the availability of
sufficient experts in the field of international law and its applicability to cyber warfare to
reach the requisite saturation point.
Another method considered was the use of an instrumental case study.
Instrumental case studies are designed specifically to gain general knowledge of a
phenomenon based on the examination of a small population (Trochim, 2007) making it
initially appealing for this study. They are also designed to focus on either a single case
or a grouping of similar cases (O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2003) and are concerned
with increasing the understanding of a phenomenon rather than the case itself (McNabb,
2008). Because case studies take information from diverse sources, there is a lack of
focus on the case as a whole (O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2003). The intended role of
this study was to determine the existing, potentially applicable, and future direction of
international law governing cyber warfare. Because of this, it was deemed that a focus
on the case in its entirety was a more appropriate research approach which, therefore,
disqualified the use of an instrumental case study.
Participants of the Study
The accuracy of results, when using the Delphi method, is based primarily on the
qualifications of the participants involved (Powell, 2003). While there have been some
negative critiques of the Delphi method’s lack of random sampling (Williams & Webb,
1994) the technique does not require that contributors be a statistically representative
sample, but rather selected based on their expertise and credibility in the area of
investigation (Powell, 2003). Because of this, a list of potential participants was
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compiled stemming from their expertise in international law and cyber warfare as
determined by their inclusion in the literature review. Through the use of snowball
sampling, additional contributors were referred by those participants that were previously
identified and invited to partake in the study. Snowball sampling is a subset of purposive
sampling, which allows for the increase of sample sizes during the course of a study
based on suggestions from research participants (Sommers, 2011). These additional
participants met both the expertise and credibility requirements necessary for inclusion in
the population group based on their reputation and referral by their peers.
An insufficient amount has been written about international law and cyber
warfare, meaning the literature review most likely does not recognize a majority of
individuals knowledgeable in the field. Because of the low number of identified potential
participants at the onset of the study, the use of snowball sampling was both necessary
and appropriate because of its ability to find hidden populations (Sommers, 2011). By
using snowball sampling, those who had published scholarly works on the subject were
utilized to recommend others potential participants qualified to contribute to the study.
This assisted in discovering a larger pool of participants as well as with meeting the
necessary number of research subjects.
The appropriate number of contributors in a Delphi study will vary based on the
research topic and the available resources (Delbecq, Van De Ven, & Gustafson, 1975).
Some researchers believe that the more participants that are involved in a study, the better
the potential outcomes. However, even many within this group recognize that there is
little scientific evidence that an increase in participation will have any effect on the
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consensus and, therefore, the reliability of results reached by the contributors (Murphy et
al., 1998). The majority of researchers using the Delphi method seemingly reject the
view that greater participation levels are ideal. A review of Delphi studies has shown that
the majority have relied on between 15 and 20 participants (Ludwig, 1997). Similarly,
Delbecq, Van De Ven, and Gustafson (1975), have proposed that between 10 and 15
contributors is sufficient for most studies. They recommend that researchers use as small
a number of participants as possible to allow for the verification of results through future
explorations. This is of particular importance in fields of study where a limited number
of possible participants exist. Based on these recommendations the targeted number of
participants for this study was 15 with the possibility that it may have exceed this number
based on greater than expected participation. It was also recognized that the study may
have failed to reach the target number because of difficulty finding willing and qualified
contributors. Because of this, invitations to participate were offered 35 individuals, with
13 additional invitations based on the results of snowball sampling. The number of
participants was deemed to be sufficient as long as it exceeded 10 for all three rounds of
questioning. During the course of this study, each round consisted of no less than 16
respondents.
Research Questions
1. At what point do computer virus attacks elevate to the level of use of force or
armed attack under international law?
2. What limitations in targeting exist with initial and reprisal cyber attacks?
3. How does the unique nature of cyber warfare affect the concept of neutrality?
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4. What impediments currently exist in the development of legal limitations on
cyber warfare?
Ethical Protection of Participants
The participants in this study consisted of volunteers whose right to choose
whether to participate or not were made clear, and in writing, during the initial
solicitation period. The potential contributors were told that, by agreeing to partake in
this study, they would be in no way affecting their relationship with Walden University
or their employers. Each participant was also told that maintaining their anonymity was
both assured and of utmost importance. There was no known risk of potential physical or
psychological harm to the contributors of this study. The initial solicitation letter and
consent form are included in the appendix of this study.
To protect confidentiality, all electronic media related to this research was
retained on a password-protected personal computer and within encrypted compression
files. Any information that may have made identifying the participants possible was
removed prior to data analysis. Paper copies of data and correspondences were not made
during the course of this study.
Data Processes, Procedures and Collection
The following represents a sequential documentation of the processes and
procedures used to solicit participants, conduct research, collect and interpret data, and
validate the findings and conclusions as approved under Institutional Review Board
number 02-24-14-0140351.
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1. Initial solicitation letters were sent via e-mail to those potential participants
identified based on their contributions to scholarly research in international
law and cyber warfare as represented in the literature review. These letters
detailed the purpose of the research, the protections provided to the
participants, and a request to refer the names and contact information of any
other known individuals whose expertise would make them ideal candidates
for inclusion in this study. Those agreeing to participate were asked to sign
and return the consent form included with the initial solicitation letter.

In theory, the Delphi technique may include an unlimited number of rounds of
questioning ending only when a consensus has been reached (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). In
reality, the vast majority of studies require no more than three rounds of questioning to
establish a consensus (Custer, Scarcella, & Stewart, 1999). The questionnaire for the first
round typically consists of open-ended questions, which allows the respondents the
freedom to elaborate (Rowe, 1999). For the purposes of this research design, it was
assumed that three rounds would be both necessary and sufficient while leaving open the
possibility that additional rounds of questioning may have been necessary.

2. Each participant was provided with the first questionnaire and asked to return
it within 2 weeks. The first and subsequent questionnaires are included in the
appendix of this study.
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Controlled feedback is an essential part of the Delphi method. Delphi studies are
designed to reduce the effect of noise which Dalkey (1972) described as a type of
communication that ensues in group processes. This noise may have a negative effect on
data validity as participants act selfishly rather than towards a shared common goal of
focusing on the question at hand. To minimize the potential for noise, feedback was
controlled by providing a well-organized summary of results allowing the participants the
opportunity to elaborate on, or correct, their previous responses. It is expected that after
using this method over multiple rounds of questioning the views of participants will
begin to converge to the point of reaching a consensus (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). As the
feedback provided is the only form of communication between contributors, it is of
paramount importance as a tool for the formulation of consensus (Murphy et al., 1998).

3. Each participant was provided with a summary of the results for the first
round of questioning. This summary restated the original questions and
provided synopses of each participant’s responses.

A qualitative review of the results for the first questionnaire provides the data
necessary for the formulation of questions in the second and subsequent rounds of
questioning. This makes it necessary to use broad open-ended questioning in the first
round while narrowing the field in the subsequent rounds (Powell, 2007).
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4. The responses provided in the first questionnaire were evaluated utilizing
QSR Nvivo and content analysis techniques. The results of this process led to
the identification of 42 follow-up questions.

The second and subsequent rounds of questioning typically employs the use of
scale scoring as the participants are asked to rate or rank previous responses (Hsu &
Sandford, 2007). For the purposes of this study, an ordinal Likert-type scale was utilized
for scoring responses and seeking consensus during the second and third rounds of
questioning. The Likert-type 7-point scale is a popular tool for measuring attitudes
because it does not rely on an expert panel (McNabb, 2008) and can use either ordinal or
interval measurements (O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2003). The scale utilized in this
study is demonstrated below.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neutral

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1. Scale scores used by respondents and their corresponding meanings.

5. Each participant was provided with the second questionnaire and asked to
return it within 2 weeks.

The areas of agreement and disagreement between participants should become
apparent based on the results of the rating system scores from the second round of
questioning (Ludwig, 1994). As this study aimed to find consensus, the scores should
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remain closely aligned among contributors with only a minor deviation. With the third
questionnaire, the participants are to be asked to revise their responses to the second
round of questioning based on the summary of results they received or to justify their
position outside of the consensus of the group. This allows for further clarification of the
data and the participants’ perceived importance of the item (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). As
positions are typically formulated in the first two rounds of questioning it was expected
that there would be little to no increase in consensus during the third round of questioning
as this is a common occurrence in Delphi studies (Jacobs, 1996).
Although the Delphi method has no firm procedure for establishing consensus, the
final round of questioning will typically show a convergence of views (Linstone & Turoff,
1975). Some researchers believe that consensus is implied by the results (Beech, 1997)
while others believe it is met when most participants in a study are in agreement
(Butterworth & Bishop, 1995). Some have even theorized that consensus can be found in
the stability of results over multiple rounds of questioning (Duffield, 1993). One
common approach to achieving consensus is to set a percentage-level standard (Hsu &
Sandford, 2007). Ulschak (1983) recommends accepting consensus if 80% of
participants are within 2 categories on a 7-point scale. For the purposes of this study,
Ulschak’s recommendation was accepted.

6. Each participant was provided with the third questionnaire and asked to return
it within 2 weeks. The third questionnaire included the scale scores for the
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second questionnaires as well as summaries of the participant’s justifications
for their positions.

At the conclusion of the study, all the participants were debriefed. Debriefings
typically occur when one or more aspects of a study were left undisclosed such as the
goals, objectives, or purposes (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2008). As this information was
provided to the participants from the onset, the debriefing was limited to presenting the
findings of the study, keeping with the stated goal of expanding knowledge and finding
consensus. Debriefings also allow for resolving potential tensions that arose between the
participants and researchers during the course of the study (Onwuegbuzie, Leech, &
Collins, 2008). This opportunity was afforded to all the participants during the debriefing.

7. Each participant was provided with the scale scores for the third
questionnaires as well as summaries of the participant’s justifications for their
positions. Additionally, they received an e-mail correspondence thanking
them for the participation and offering to answer any questions they had about
the study.
Data Analysis
The method of data analysis used with the Delphi method varies according the
purpose and structure of the study (Powell, 2007). The most common approach is to use
content analysis techniques during the first round of questioning followed by ranking or
rating techniques during the second and subsequent rounds (Jairath & Weinstein, 1994).
This was the approach utilized for this study.
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The use of content analysis techniques for the first round of questioning stems
from the need to describe the attributes of the participants responses (Denscombe, 1998)
while making inferences about variables discovered in the text through the objective
analysis of it (Sproull, 1988). This allows for quantifying the participants texts in a clear
and easily replicable format while eliminating contextual and implied meaning (McNabb,
2008).
Qualitative content analysis focuses on both the content and contextual meaning
of responses (Tesch, 1990) and requires examining the language to classify responses
into categories of similar meaning (Weber, 1990). These categories stem from both the
explicit comments of participants as well as their inferred meanings (Downe-Wamboldt,
1992). One form of content analysis is conventional content analysis. It is typically used
to describe a phenomenon when little or no existing theories or research literature exists.
It is also beneficial for gathering data without developing preconceived notions about
response categories (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). These attributes made this approach ideal
for this study based on the lack of extensive research or established theories as to the
status of cyber warfare under international law.
With conventional content analysis, the researcher starts by repeatedly reading all
data as a whole in order to reach a level of saturation as to the responses (Tesch, 1990).
From there, responses are to be reread with specific attention paid to key terms that
appear to capture the theme being conveyed. These key concepts are referred to as codes.
(Morse & Field, 1995). Next, the researcher records their initial impressions and analysis
of the responses, which aids in developing effective descriptive names for the codes.
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These codes are then more easily sorted to reflect relation and linkage allowing for the
development of meaningful categories (Patton, 2002). QSR Nvivo, a computer program
designed for qualitative research, was used as an aid in the development of content
analysis in this manner.
Role of the Researcher
The role of the researcher in a qualitative study may be split into a seven stage
process: Thematizing, designing, interviewing, transcribing, analyzing, verifying, and
reporting (Fink, 2000). Thematizing refers to determining the topic of the study, the
reasoning for the topic, and the methodology to be utilized. Creswell (2007) stated that
researchers should fall back on their own experiences and knowledge when creating a
study. Based on Creswell’s recommendation, the topic of this study was selected based
on the researcher' experiences and education with information technology and
international relations.
In qualitative studies, the researcher is to be considered an instrument of data
collection meaning, among other things, that he or she should describe themselves in
relation to the study including any biases or assumptions (Greenback, 2003). To this end,
I hold undergraduate degrees in computer studies and political science as well as graduate
degrees in both international relations and public administration. My educational
background has permitted me to learn a number of computer programming languages and
to pursue topics in international law including the laws of war. My formal education was
supplemented by a background in computer programming having grown up the son of a
military systems analyst. Over the last 12 years, I have instructed various courses in
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computer topics and political science at the college level. My interest into a deeper
understanding of the laws of war as they relate to cyber warfare was initially triggered by
media reports of a successful penetration of the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz with a
computer worm later named Stuxnet.
Because of the researcher’s central role in data collection and analysis it is
necessary to minimize the potential for any biases, which are to be discussed further in
the following section. One method used in this study to mitigate potential bias is the use
of bracketing. Bracketing is the process whereby researchers recognize and subjugate
their own biases and assumptions when describing a phenomenon (Given 2008). One
way of doing this is to keep a research journal (Greenbach, 2003). During the course of
this study, I maintained a journal which contained my feelings and reactions while
interacting with participants as well as thoughts about myself and my past that surfaced in
relation to the research.
Verification of Findings
The credibility of findings in a Delphi study hinges primarily on a decision trail
that shows that the method of inquiry, composition of the participants, data collection
procedures, justification of consensus levels, and the means of dissemination and
implementation are all appropriate for the area of study (Powell, 2003). This study
provides an extensive description of processes to allow for either verification through
replication or application to other areas of common characteristics or traits. The use of
snowball sampling also increases the credibility of this research as it further limits the
potential for research bias in the selection of participants (Shenton, 2004).
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Creswell (2007) described a need for researchers to clarify and announce any
potential bias so as to allow the reader to understand the position of the researcher. As
such, I affirm that I do not now, nor have I previously, worked in either the information
technology or international law sectors. Additionally, I have no known ties to any of the
participants of this study and do not have any expectation of profit based on any specific
results of this study.
A question about the transferability of qualitative research exists as a potential
limitation. Erlandson (1993) noted that many researchers believe that it is impossible to
transfer generalizations because the observations used to form the generalizations are
relevant only within the contexts in which they occur. Conversely, other researchers
have proposed that while each study may be unique, they remain representative of the
larger population group and, therefore, the validity of transferability cannot be summarily
dismissed (Denscombe, 1998). In this study, I have provided comprehensive information
on the settings, methods, and population used to allow those researchers who accept the
transferability of qualitative research to apply the process utilized in this study to their
own research and, therefore, further the dependability of this study through replication.
Lastly, to assist in the confirmability of results, the methodology used allowed all
participants to review the results after each round of inquiry. This provided an
opportunity for them to correct or expand upon their responses during the following
round. In doing so, each respondent was able to confirm the accurate representation of
their individual views and, therefore, the results for the group.
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Issues of Trustworthiness
One limitation with the utilization of the Delphi method is the time involved and
its effect on participation. Many researchers recommend a maximum of 45 days for the
collection of data (Delbecq, Van De Ven, & Gustafson, 1975, Ulschak, 1983, Ludwig,
1994) with Delbecq, Van De Ven, and Gustafson (1975) stating that participants should
be encouraged to respond within two weeks of receipt of a questionnaire. Compounding
the problem is that weeks may pass between any two rounds of questioning (Ludwig,
1994). The length of the study and inactivity that occurs between rounds has the
potential to be a challenge to participation rates. This requires that the researcher take an
active role in maintaining participation levels (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). Modern
technology helps to shorten the time involved and, therefore, assists in maintaining
participation levels. The delivery of questionnaires and responses can occur almost
instantaneously while their preparation and evaluation can be processed faster and more
conveniently using electronic means (Altschuld, 1995).
Another limitation is the nature of the measures and validation used with the
Delphi method. Sackman (1975) has criticized the Delphi method for its inability to
utilize established scientific validation and the reliability of its measures. This argument
has been countered by proponents of the Delphi method who state that it should not be
held to the same scientific standards as many other methodologies as it was designed to
allow for the studying of a phenomenon that lacks conclusive data (Murphy et al, 1998).
The use of researcher feedback, while imperative in the Delphi method, may have
the unintended consequence of shaping the opinions of the participants by inadvertently
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moving responses towards the researcher’s biases (Altschuld, 1995). Studies have shown
that respondents to a Delphi questionnaire will alter their answers if given erroneous
feedback (Scheibe, Skutsch, & Schofer, 1975). This stems from participants potentially
feeling pressure to conform to the ratings established by the group after they are made
aware of the deviation of their own responses (Witkin & Altschuld, 1995). To help
address this potential limitation participants were instructed at the onset of the study that
divergence from consensus is an acceptable and valid response.
Summary
A Delphi method of inquiry was selected for this study primarily because this
methodology allows for a more accurate assessment by the respondents than would be
found in a group setting (Rowe, Wright, & Bulger, 1991). This stems from participants
in group settings tending to create a hierarchy of dominance among contributors (Murphy
et al, 1998) which may cause non-dominate participants to become inhibited (Rowe,
Wright, & Bulger, 1991). The participants for this study are recognized as experts in
cyber warfare and international law based on published scholarly works and their
credibility with their colleagues. This coupled with the anonymity that this study
provided the respondents should have mitigated this potential effect.
Data collection was designed to occur over a period of 8 weeks and three rounds
of questioning. The first questionnaire consisted of open-ended questions that granted
the respondents a wide range of freedom to elaborate and, therefore, allowed for the
discovery of major themes. In subsequent rounds of questioning, the major themes were
narrowed as participants revised their responses. After three rounds of questioning, a
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consensus of opinion based on a Likert-type 7-point scale was expected to have been met.
Consensus was measured based on 80% of responses being within 2 categories on the
Likert-type scale. Possible verification of the findings reported in the following chapter
has been made possible based on the extensive presentation of the methodology and
decision trail used for this study. This documentation will allow for replication and
application in similar studies as well as provide clarification as to any potential researcher
bias.
In the following chapter, an in-depth description of the data and results of the
study is provided to include methods of data collection, analysis, and trustworthiness as
well as questions, responses, and scale scores for each round of inquiry.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
This study has explored the legality of cyber warfare operations under
international law in order to fill a gap in the current literature. To meet this end, 16
scholars in the fields of international law and cyber warfare participated in three rounds
of inquiry utilizing written surveys to determine their opinions on various themes
affecting this topic. Specifically, this study’s aim was to answer the following research
questions:
1. At what point do computer virus attacks elevate to the level of use of force or
armed attack under international law?
2. What limitations in targeting exist with initial and reprisal cyber attacks?
3. How does the unique nature of cyber warfare affect the concept of neutrality?
4. What impediments currently exist in the development of legal limitations on
cyber warfare?
This chapter presents a focused review of the findings for this qualitative content
analysis study. The process will consist of describing the participants and settings,
methods of data collection, storage, and analysis, as well as the results and data
verification that occurred and as described in Chapter 3. The results presented will
include both quantitative data depicted in numerous figures based on responses to
questions scored on a Likert-type scale as well as summaries of the written justifications
for these scores as provided by the participants.
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Setting and Demographics
The research proposal for this study received Walden University Institutional
Review Board approval on February 25, 2014 under approval number 02-24-14-0140351
with an expiration date of February 23, 2015. Solicitation of participants began on March
12, 2014 and concluded on March 21, 2014 with affirmative responses from 18
individuals. Recruitment occurred by e-mail invitation to individuals in the fields of
cyber warfare and international law based on their scholarly records in these fields.
Additional participants were identified through the use of snowball sampling as those
invited to participate were asked to nominate potential contributors who they deemed
qualified to be included in the study.
Of the 18 original participants, 10 came from a predominantly international law
background while the remaining 8 were primarily trained in information technology.
One participant from each category withdrew during the course of the study.
Additionally, 12 of the 18 held academic positions at the time of their solicitation while 6
principally worked in an information technology field in either the private or government
sectors; 2 and 4 individuals, respectively. Both individuals who withdrew from the study
came from the academia group. Lastly, the demographics of the participants included ten
men versus eight women, nine and seven, respectively, at the conclusion of the study,
representing three separate predominantly English speaking countries.
Data Collection
The first round of inquiry began March 22, 2014 and was scheduled to conclude
on April 13, 2014. Because all participants returned their completed questionnaires by
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April 9, 2014 the first round on inquiry was terminated early. Follow-up questionnaires
could only be created after a thorough review of the results for the first round of
questioning and an additional Institutional Review Board assessment to mitigate any
potential ethical concerns. Questionnaires 2 and 3 were submitted to the Walden
University Institutional Review Board on April 15, 2014 and received approval for usage
on April 22, 2014. This authorization allowed for the resumption of data collection on
April 22, 2014 with the second round of inquiry concluding on May 6, 2014. The third
and final round of inquiry lasted from May 16, 2014 to June 6, 2014. 16 participants
from the original group of 18 contributed for all three rounds of data collection with one
departing between the first and second rounds of inquiry and one doing so during the
course of the second round.
All three rounds of inquiry consisted of e-mail correspondence between the
participants and the researcher. The questionnaire used during the third round included
the results from the second round of inquiry as feedback for the participants to review
before responding to the same questions. The feedback consisted of both the scale scores
and a synopsis of the narratives used to justify those scores. The use of synopses rather
than full text was necessary to help protect the identity of the participants. Most of the
respondents had been published in peer reviewed journals leaving the possibility that
specific phrases or writing patterns may have left them open to identification. All
communication occurred by e-mail leaving the actual setting for the participants’
completion of the questionnaires unknown.
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To further ensure the respondents’ anonymity, all e-mail correspondence was
downloaded to a password protected home computer and permanently removed from the
e-mail account. Upon downloading, each was coded with an alpha-numeric sequence
that identified each participant only to the researcher and any information that could
identify the contributor was expunged. Questionnaires were saved within files
established for each participant using a 256 bit AES encryption algorithm. These files
were not printed or transferred to another location.
Data Analysis
Analysis of the data began using nine open-ended questions during the first round
of inquiry. The narratives provided were entered into QSR Nvivo to assist in locating
common themes which were then again reviewed in their original form and rewritten to
create the questions used during the second and third rounds of inquiry. The findings for
the second and third rounds of inquiry were quantitatively analyzed through the ranking
of scale scores given by the participants and included summaries of the respondents’
written justifications for their scores.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
The evidence of trustworthiness for this study began with the original solicitation
of the participants. As part of the solicitation, I identified myself to the potential
participants and described my role as the researcher in the study. Specifically, I
expressed to each contributor that I had no personal stake in the results and throughout
the duration of the study did not communicate any personal beliefs or experiences that
may have influenced the responses.

68
The credibility of findings in a Delphi study is based primarily on the decision
trail. The trail must properly and thoroughly represent the method of inquiry,
composition of the participants, data collection procedures, justification of consensus
levels, and whether the means of dissemination and implementation are all appropriate
for the area of study (Powell, 2003). To meet these ends, an exacting methodology was
described in Chapter 3 of this study and adhered to rigidly. Following the given
methodology should allow other researchers to mimic these procedures in an attempt to
confirm or expand upon the results of this study. This includes the use of snowball
sampling which Shenton (2004) stated would help to minimize research bias, as well as
accepting the 80% standard recommended by Ulschak (1983) for meeting a consensus in
a Delphi study.
One intended method for establishing the trustworthiness of this study that was
ultimately abandoned was the release of verbatim narratives when reporting the results.
It became apparent after the first round of inquiry that some of the respondents had the
tendency to use specific catch phrases or syntax and a review of published works showed
some of these same idiosyncrasies. It was determined that these would need to be
eliminated in order to safeguard the identities of the contributors. Therefore, abridged
comments were used when formulating the questions for the subsequent questionnaires
and when providing feedback to the participants. This same precaution was utilized
when drafting the results of this study. Altering the written responses given by the
participants when providing feedback could potentially allow for the unintended
incorporation of the researchers own biases but, this is already recognized as a potential
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phenomenon within Delphi studies (Altschuld, 1995). The use of feedback and multiple
rounds of inquiry utilizing the same questions and formats should have a mitigating effect
on potential bias as all the respondents were able to review these remarks and comment
on them before the conclusion of the study. Additionally, the truncated comments should
remain specific enough for comparison to other like studies.
Lastly, the length of a Delphi study has been shown to have some effect on the
trustworthiness of the results because of retention rates. It has been recommended that
Delphi studies not exceed 45 days for this reason (Delbecq, Van De Ven, & Gustafson,
1975, Ulschak, 1983, Ludwig, 1994). This study was able to surpass this figure without
any further attrition among the participants as the 2 that withdrew from the study did so
early on. The retention rate for this study was 88.9%.
Results
In an attempt to answer the research questions, the questionnaires were divided
into related sections based on categories similar to those reflected in the literature review
found in this study. These groupings allowed for easier comparison of results to
determine themes and trends in the following chapter. Each question is provided below
along with a summarization of written responses and followed by a table showing scale
scores for each round.
Use of Force and Armed Attack Designations
Question 1. An effective formula for determining whether a cyber attack has
reached the level of use of force or armed attack under international law is by comparing
its scope and effect to kinetic attacks.
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Figure 2. Scale score responses for Question 1.

During both rounds of inquiry, the consensus was to agree with this statement.
Among the respondents who agreed with the statement, the belief that the laws of armed
conflict do not differentiate between kinetic and cyber attacks was often referenced.
Additionally, some felt that this formula had only a few areas of ambiguity which could
generally be solved using scope, duration, and intensity as a measuring stick. The
dissenting vote was based on the belief that attribution issues with cyber warfare and
determining whether it was truly an attack rather than a hugely coincidental conflagration
of errors meant that it may work in some instances but not for others.
Question 2. Although a cyber attack may fall below the standard of use of force
or armed attack they most likely would still be deemed illegal under criminal law.
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Figure 3. Scale score responses for Question 2.

During both rounds of inquiry, the consensus was to agree with this statement.
The respondents’ belief was based primary on the codification of certain cyber activities
such as illegal access, data and system interference, and the general misuse of computer
and network devices as criminal offenses under the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime
(2001). Conversely, the sole dissenting opinion was based on the belief that it would be
impossible to evaluate the statement without knowing more about the nature of the cyber
attack, the specific criminal law paradigm that applies, and additional factors such as
national jurisdiction.
Question 3. To classify a cyber attack as an armed attack under international law
the cyber attack must threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of the
offended state.
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Figure 4. Scale score responses for Question 3.

During the second round of questioning, opinions varied greatly with this question
as only one more participant agreed with it than disagreed and three of the respondents
took a neutral position. Among those disagreeing with the premise, there was a belief
that this definition would exclude certain acts such as the Japanese bombing of Pearl
Harbor in 1941 or the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For this reason, these
respondents determined it was not an appropriate tool for measuring an armed attack.
Others who disagreed with the premise did so based on the belief that the definition better
fit a use of force designation than an armed attack designation under international law.
While many of the proponents of this statement did so based on a belief that it was
consistent with international law several waivered in this view during the third round of
questioning after being exposed to the Pearl Harbor analogy. This was the primary
reason given for the strong shift in opinions towards disagreeing with the question during
the final round of inquiry. Based on this shift in opinion the minimum standard for
consensus was met.
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Question 4. A cyber attack constitutes a use of force whenever it targets critical
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Figure 5. Scale score responses for Question 4.

During the second round of inquiry, results for this question were varied over 5
different points on the 7-point scale. Those disagreeing with the given statement did so
based on the belief that it was inconsistent with international law and specifically in that
Article 2(4) makes no reference to critical national infrastructure. Additionally, it was
believed that there was a lack of state practice to make this assertion. Among those who
agreed with the question, some opinions were qualified with statements including that the
targeting of critical national infrastructure is not a sufficient criteria by itself but a factor
in the overall determination of whether an attack constitutes a use of force. During the
third round of inquiry a number of those who had qualified their support for the principle
of the question changed their scores based on the provided feedback. This shift led to a
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strong majority opinion to disagree or strongly disagree with the question but fell short of
the required number of responses to reach a consensus.
Question 5. A significant loss of control over a computerized system is serious
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Figure 6. Scale score responses for Question 5.

A clear consensus against the given statement was achieved during both rounds of
inquiry. The consensus of opinion was that the loss of a single system would be a
violation of sovereignty but not a use of force under international law. Additionally, it
was stated that a use of force designation needs to be based on the effects of the attack
rather than just the identity of the target. Lastly, it was posited that a design flaw or bug
could have led to the loss of control while the cyber attack had no intention of causing
such an effect. Neutral opinions on the question were based on the need to know more
about how the loss of control was achieved and whether the computerized system was
civilian or government.
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Question 6. Because the Stuxnet virus caused severe physical damage to
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Figure 7. Scale score responses for Question 6.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus to agree with the question was
garnered. All participants agreeing with the statement believed that the nature of the
damage rather than the method of delivery was the primary principle of importance as
long as the impairment was tangible. The one contributor who was neutral on the topic
did so because of concerns as to how Stuxnet was introduced to a closed facility.
Another respondent attempted to dispel this concern by declaring that acts of sabotage
can be classified as an armed attack when the results are similar to a bomb.
Question 7. A use of force or armed attack designation can be assigned
collectively to cyber attacks that reoccur in a short period of time even though the
individual attacks do not warrant this designation.
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Figure 8. Scale score responses for Question 7.

A consensus to somewhat agree or agree with this question was met during both
rounds of inquiry. A majority of participants somewhat agreed with the question based
on the belief that the premise was reasonable with some adding that attribution would
need to show the same or related actors were responsible for the related attacks.
Additional respondents somewhat agreed with the caveat that their agreement was based
on the cumulative effects of the attacks being serious enough to warrant either a use of
force or armed attack designation. The one respondent who strongly agreed with the
statement justified their response based on the belief that kinetic attacks generally
comprise a set of actions in time much the same way that multiple cyber attacks do.
Those who disagreed with the given question did so out of concerns as to how to
delineate the starting and ending period used when determining the cumulative effects.
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Question 8. A cyber attack against a major economic entity, such as the New
York Stock Exchange, that results in no loss of life or physical damage may still meet the
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Figure 9. Scale score responses for Question 8.

After two rounds of questioning, a consensus as to the validity of this question
could not be reached. The majority of respondents agreed with the premise of the
question based on the belief that damage need not be physical and specifically if it was
severe enough. Two respondents equated data damage with that of physical attacks and
found no difference between them. Among those disagreeing with the question, there
was a belief that non-physical damage would be unlikely to reach levels necessary for an
armed attack designation under international law. Additionally, some felt that even if
such levels could be reached the necessary significance of the entity on the national
economic system would severely limit which targets could be worthy of such a
designation.
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Question 9. A cyber attack that alters data or the functionality of a system, but
causes no direct or indirect physical damage, cannot be classified as an armed attack
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Figure 10. Scale score responses for Question 9.

During both rounds of inquiry, responses to the question were primarily to
disagree or strongly disagree with the premise. A consensus was reached based chiefly
on the belief that changing the functionality of a system is a form of damage since
functionality of a system is part of its integrity. Some disagreeing with the statement
included a caveat that the specific nature of the effects would also have to be taken into
account. Dissenting opinions were based on the belief that altering data and
functionalities are most likely reversible and, therefore, may not constitute damage.
Question 10. A cyber attack that has been foiled by passive defenses, and which
otherwise would have resulted in serious physical damage or loss of life, may still be
categorized as an armed attack.
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Figure 11. Scale score responses for Question 10.

During both rounds of inquiry, there was a consensus to agree or strongly agree
with the question. The justifications for these opinions were based primarily on the intent
of the attacker and not the end results. One participant likened this scenario to that of a
missile launched against a city that falls harmlessly short of its target. Because they
believed such an action would be considered an armed attack under international law,
they felt the same of the failed cyber attack. Dissenting opinions were primarily based on
the fact that no actual damage occurred with the failed attack.
Proportionality, Necessity, Immediacy, and Attribution
Question 11. For cyber attacks, immediacy should be predicated on the time
reasonable attribution is made rather than when the effects of the attack are detected.
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Figure 12. Scale score responses for Question 11.

After two rounds of inquiry, no consensus or clear majority opinion was achieved
nor were any of the participants willing to move from their original opinions. Among
those who agreed with the question there was a belief that doing so would allow
underdeveloped countries time to respond as well as allow all countries the necessary
time to reasonably identify the attacker and their intent. Even among those who agreed
with the premise of this question there was recognition that it could lead to abuses and
that current international law may not allow for it. This position was also taken by a
number of participants who opposed the assertion of the question with some these
individuals believing that international law requires that immediacy be predicated on the
effects. Among those who somewhat disagreed with the question, there was a belief that
international law is still developing in this area, and the question may be valid in the
future. Lastly, one participant took issue with the belief that additional time should be
afforded to underdeveloped countries because they felt that each country must be held to
the same standard.
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Question 12. Because the Stuxnet virus was discovered so long after it began
degrading the equipment in the Natanz nuclear facility, Iran lost the legal right under

Number of Participants

international law to respond in self-defense.
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Round 2
Round 3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Scale Score
Figure 13. Scale score responses for Question 12.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus to disagree with the question was
reached. Consensus was arrived at primarily because of the belief that immediacy should
be based on the time of effects or attribution neither of which had previously occurred.
One respondent equated this scenario to that of a biological attack which may have a
delayed recognition of effects but still affords the victimized state the right to respond.
The two participants who were neutral on the question did so for different reasons. One
felt that the law wasn’t fully developed enough to make a sound decision and envisioned
it being set in the future based on state practice. The other neutral opinion came from a
participant who took issue with the validity of the question because it assumed that the
Stuxnet virus could be categorized as a weapon.
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Question 13. The concept of self-defense under international law is problematic
when applied to cyber attacks. The stated point of self-defense, to disarm the attacker, is
difficult to accomplish in cyberspace considering that the attacker is most likely not
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Figure 14. Scale score responses for Question 13.

During both rounds of inquiry, the consensus was to disagree or somewhat
disagree with the question. Responses to this question included varying justifications
even among those who scored the question the same. Among those who disagreed, there
was a belief that the assumption of the question, that self-defense aims to disarm an
attacker, is flawed. Some respondents added to this by stating that the role of selfdefense is to prevent an attack from succeeding. This point was additionally raised by
one participant who was neutral on the question. Others disagreed with the premise of
the question on technical grounds stating that software will be the same across multiple
systems providing a focal point for counterattack. Lastly, some felt that the question
could also apply to kinetic attacks.
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Question 14. The laws of armed conflict would require that any response to a

Number of Participants

cyber attack remain in the cyber arena to meet the obligation for proportionality.
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Round 2
Round 3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Scale Score
Figure 15. Scale score responses for Question 14.

During both rounds of inquiry, the consensus was to disagree or strongly disagree
with the question. This position was most often justified based on the belief that the
response only needs to be proportional in effects rather than in methods. Analogies were
provided that other forms of attack such as assassinations or the use of nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons do not require responses in kind. Among the 2
participants who strongly agreed with the question, the belief existed that cyber warfare is
too different from any other type of warfare making it difficult to justify using kinetic or
other physical means in response to a cyber attack.
Question 15. Necessity would be difficult to argue in response to a cyber attack,
as any response by the offended state would most likely not curb the ongoing effects of
the initial cyber attack.
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Figure 16. Scale score responses for Question 15.

During both rounds of inquiry, the consensus was to disagree or strongly disagree
with the question as all participants scored their responses in one of the two categories.
Participants primarily justified their score based on the belief that the response would be
justified in an attempt to overcome any further provocations even if the effects of the
initial cyber attack had run their course. One example of this was a counterattack that
would monopolize the attacking state’s resources limiting their ability to continue to
attack.
Question 16. The fact that a cyber attack has originated from a governmentoperated computer system is not sufficient enough evidence to attribute the attack to the
state or to take action against the state.
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Figure 17. Scale score responses for Question 16.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus was reached to either agree or
somewhat agree with the question. Justifications for these scores were based primarily
on the belief that private individuals or foreign state actors may have commandeered the
system or even spoofed it such as with distributed denial-of-service or botnets. Some
respondents who somewhat agreed with the statement believed that it was possible to
sufficiently determine attribution in some cases, but most would require further
investigation.
Question 17. Cyber attacks may be launched for defensive purposes in the name
of necessity even when the identity of the aggressor cannot be clearly attributed.
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Figure 18. Scale score responses for Question 17.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus to agree or somewhat agree with the
question was reached. Among the consensus, a number of respondents provided caveats
to their determination. Some felt that the statement was true only if essential interests
were involved while others questioned why means other than an attack could not
sufficiently address the state’s concern. Additional participants stated that attacks could
be launched at source infrastructure in order to resist an attack, even if the identity of the
attacker was not determinable. The participant who strongly disagreed with the question
did so based on their belief that attribution requirements could not be legally weakened
for counterattacks.
Means and Targets of Cyber Attack
Question 18. The concept of anticipatory self-defense only applies to instances
when a cyber attack is a component of a greater armed assault.
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Figure 19. Scale score responses for Question 18.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus existed to disagree with the question.
Justifications among these participants typically consisted of a belief that the standard is
for an armed attack regardless of the modality. Some believed that the decision to act
was solely a political one. Dissenting opinions were based on the belief that anticipatory
self-defense is rarely legal under international law and additional issues with attribution
would only raise a cyber attack to this level if it was a component of a larger, non-cyber
attack.
Question 19. No target, civilian or government, has complete legal protection
from a cyber attack if there is an overriding military necessity.
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Figure 20. Scale score responses for Question 19.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus was reached to either disagree or
strongly disagree with the premise of the question. Those within the consensus used
various analogies such as replacing the word “cyber” with “nuclear” in an attempt to
support their position. Other participants felt that accepting the premise of the question
would violate jus cogens that necessity cannot justify. Other respondents who disagreed
with the question felt that accepting the premise would too easily lead to abuses such as
targeting medical facilities. The single neutral opinion accepted the possibility that the
question may be true, but felt more information was needed as to the proportionality and
soundness of the justification to claim necessity. Those agreeing with the question took
the opinion that the statement was in keeping with international norms and therefore did
not violate jus cogens.
Question 20. A cyber attack, that uses malware that cannot be controlled after
being deployed, would be illegal under international law.
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Figure 21. Scale score responses for Question 20.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus was reached to slightly disagree or be
neutral on the question. Some of those slightly disagreeing did so based on the belief that
international law only requires that states consider the possibilities of collateral damage
and do what is reasonable to limit it rather than a requirement to eliminate it all together.
The Stuxnet virus was used as an example as it continued to spread throughout various
countries but was removable and caused no real negative effects outside of the Natanz
facility. Among those neutral on the question, there was the belief that if the malware
remained within military systems they may be legal under international law. Dissenting
opinions were made primarily based on the belief that the effects of such attacks would
violate both the proportionality and discrimination principles of the laws of armed
conflict.
Question 21. To remain legal under international law, cyber-defense systems may
not have an active component that automatically responds to a cyber attack with
offensive measures of its own.
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Figure 22. Scale score responses for Question 21.

After two rounds of inquiry, no consensus of opinion was reached for this
question. The majority of respondents either disagreed or somewhat disagreed with the
premise. Opinions among this group were based primarily on the nature of the offensive
measure leaving most responses as a matter of national discretion. Neutral opinions were
also based on the nature of the offensive measure but gave less credence to the concept of
national discretion. Those strongly agreeing with the question cited issues with
attribution as they believed that automated active components would most likely lead to
responses that erroneously target neutral states. This would cause the defensive systems
to be categorized as unprovoked attacks rather than defensive counterattacks.
Question 22. Cyber weapons may be illegal under international law because
governments cannot reasonably maintain control over them or be held accountable for
their use.
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Figure 23. Scale score responses for Question 22.

During both rounds of inquiry, the consensus was to either disagree or strongly
disagree with the question. Responses were primarily clustered around whether cyber
weapons can be reasonably controlled. Among those in the consensus, there was a belief
that the level of control that exists over most cyber weapons meets the requirement under
international law. Among those agreeing with the question, it was determined that cyber
weapons do not meet this requirements because they require more stringent controls that
kinetic weapons. This was based on multiple factors such as their increased
transferability and deployment.
Question 23. Civilians maintain their non-combatant protections under
international law even when directly participating in cyber attacks.
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Figure 24. Scale score responses for Question 23.

During both rounds of inquiry, the consensus was to either disagree or strongly
disagree with the question. The common belief among the consensus was that civilians
forfeit their protections under international law when they are involved in offensive cyber
operations. An example provided by one participant was that playing an active role in a
cyber attack is considerably worse than working in a munitions factory but factory
workers forfeit their protections under the laws of armed conflict. Among those
somewhat disagreeing with the question, the decision as to the status of civilians is based
on the nature of cyber attack with only those causing death or physical destruction
leading to a forfeiture of legal protections.
Question 24. A cyber weapon designed to look like legitimate civilian network
traffic would violate the prohibition against perfidy.
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Figure 25. Scale score responses for Question 24.

Results for the second round on inquiry were inconclusive with no consensus or
majority of opinion. During the third round, after the opinions of the respondents were
shared with all participants, a consensus was reached to either disagree or somewhat
disagree with the question. The consensus of opinion was primarily based on one of two
factors. The first was to disagree based on the belief that laws of perfidy apply only to
active agents and therefore do not cover network traffic. Also, some took this further to
state that perfidy would only apply if the cyber attack led to a loss of life as property
destruction would not be covered. The second justification was based on current
engineering standards as it was said to be difficult to prove an intentional design issue
rather than just a normal design. This was important to some participants because perfidy
only covers acts of treachery.
Question 25. A cyber weapons designed to look like the legitimate network
traffic of an international organization, such as the United Nations or Red Cross, would
be illegal under international law.
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Figure 26. Scale score responses for Question 25.

For this question, no clear consensus could be reached during either round of
inquiry. The most common response given was to somewhat agree primarily because the
organizations mentioned have protected status under the laws of armed conflict. One
caveat given was based on all network traffic looking similar as they use the same
protocols, such as IP, TCP, and HTTP. Based on this some respondents felt a cyber
weapon would have to be intentionally designed to look like it came from a protected
organization. The one respondent strongly disagreeing felt that based on current
engineering standards this could not be done. Specifically, they felt that it would be
impossible to prove that it was an intentional design rather than a normal design that
made the cyber weapon appear to be from one of these organizations. Among some of
the remaining respondents who took a negative view of the question, there was the belief
that perfidy only applies to active agents such as computer programs and not the
communication to deliver it.

95

Question 26. It is conceptually impossible to perform an economic blockade
solely by cyber means; therefore, any denial of service attack against a state’s industries
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Figure 27. Scale score responses for Question 26.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus was reached to disagree or somewhat
disagree with the question. Among the respondents, there was an opinion that a blockade
of first or second world economies could be performed through cyber means but not third
world economies. This was deemed especially true because a blockade need not stop all
economic activity or be completely effective to be labeled a blockade. Some respondents
also felt that the development of cyber weapons and online economic activities will most
likely increase the ability to economically blockade a state in the future. It should also be
noted that two participants whose specialization is in international law felt their
knowledge of cyber operations was too limited to definitively respond to the question.
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Neutrality and a Cyber Global Commons
Question 27. The Hague Convention V states that neutral states have no
obligation to disrupt communications passing through their publically accessible
communication systems. This would not apply to cyber weapons since they are means of
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Figure 28. Scale score responses for Question 27.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus was reached to agree or strongly agree
with the question. For some of those strongly agreeing with the question, there was a
belief that accepting the premise would create an undue burden on states to monitor
network traffic. The same group also tended to feel that the cyber weapon was a program
running on a computer and not the communications controlling it. There was a difference
of opinion on this point with one of the respondents who somewhat agreed with the
question stating that a cyber weapon was both the program and the communications
controlling it.

97
Question 28. Because it would be an undue burden on the citizens of a neutral
state to disrupt network communications, a neutral state is under no legal obligation to
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Figure 29. Scale score responses for Question 28.

After two rounds of inquiry, a consensus could not be reached for this question.
The most common response was to be neutral on the question because of a perceived
ambiguity in international law. Among those somewhat disagreeing with the question,
there was a belief that because the state’s public systems were knowingly being used that
the failure to intervene may cause the state to lose its neutrality. An equal number of
respondents somewhat agreed with the question primarily because they felt it was fact
specific and could not be covered using a single analogy. The final group of respondents
strongly agreed with the assertion for a variety of reasons but primarily because they did
not classify the transfer of network data as an armed attack or the failure to interfere with
such communications as vacating the states neutrality.
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Question 29. Because of the redundancy built into networks and the inability to
direct packets through specific paths, the travelling of packets containing cyber weapons
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Figure 30. Scale score responses for Question 29.

During both rounds of inquiry, the consensus of the participants was to agree or
strongly agree with the question. A common theme among those in the consensus was
that the packets carrying the cyber weapon is a form of communication and not a weapon
itself. Others in the consensus pointed out that the question also supplied the answer.
Namely that the packets are routed to a destination but the path they take to get there is
typically not predetermined.
Question 30. A state may legally disable or destroy network infrastructure in a
neutral country if the neutral country is unable or unwilling to stop the use of its
equipment to route cyber attacks.
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Figure 31. Scale score responses for Question 30.

After two rounds of inquiry, a consensus of opinion for this question could not be
reached. The most common response was to agree with the question based on the belief
that it was in keeping with the laws of neutrality. Because of the arguments provided by
those disagreeing with the question, two respondents who initially agreed took a neutral
position on the question during the third round of inquiry. The arguments provided
centered on the belief that it is easier to block traffic than disable or destroy infrastructure
in a neutral state and that taking action against a neutral state would be an unjustifiable
act of war.
Question 31. Because every component of cyberspace resides in the sovereign
territory of a nation-state or under its control, an international agreement designating
cyberspace a global common is virtually impossible.
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Figure 32. Scale score responses for Question 31.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus was reached to agree or strongly agree
with little need to elaborate on the justification provided by the question. Among those
disagreeing with the consensus, there was a belief that other international agreements
have been made on topics such as global warming and terrorism that also had to resolve
issues of sovereignty such as those present with cyberspace. One participant was unable
to respond to the question because they disagreed with the premise that “every
component of cyberspace resides in the sovereign territory of a nation-state or under its
control” and felt it more appropriate to not respond rather than disagree.
Question 32. Designating cyberspace a global common would eliminate any
concerns over neutrality or sovereignty when conducting cyber warfare operations.
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Figure 33. Scale score responses for Question 32.

A consensus to disagree or strongly disagree was reached for this question during
both rounds of inquiry. These opinions were based on the belief that some measure of
sovereignty exists even in a global commons. An analogy provided by one respondent
was that a public park is a common but, visitors to the park still have sovereignty over
their wallets. Two participants were neutral on the question because they did not feel
they were informed enough to agree with or dispute the consensus of opinion.
Ethics and Cyber-Specific Legal Limitations
Question 33. The use of customary law to develop limitations specific to cyber
warfare is restricted because the secrecy surrounding cyber operations has led to a lack of
available state practice or opinio juris.
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Figure 34. Scale score responses for Question 33.

After two rounds of inquiry, a consensus could not be reached on this question.
The most common position was to agree with the question with some respondents adding
that the issue is a temporary one that will be resolved in the future. Among those
strongly disagreeing or somewhat disagreeing, the belief existed that the secrecy is only
present in regards to specific issues such as targets and the vulnerabilities being
exploited. This group believed that since the methods are well known there is sufficient
evidence on which to base state practice.
Question 34. Because the leading cyber powers have shown no inclination
towards limiting their cyber warfare potential, the use of customary law is likely the only
way to develop such limitations.
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Figure 35. Scale score responses for Question 34.

While opinions were initially inconclusive for this question, by the final round of
inquiry a consensus to disagree or strongly disagree emerged. Among those in the
consensus, there was a belief that recent international agreements on cybercrime suggests
a potential willingness among the leading cyber states to legally limit cyber warfare.
Others argued that some states have recognized that the laws of armed conflict are
applicable to cyber warfare. Even among those in the consensus there was the belief that
a treaty limiting cyber warfare is still far off and will require a great deal of negotiation.
Question 35. States have intentionally been unwilling to address legally limiting
the use of cyber weapons so as to allow for maximum flexibility in the conduct of cyber
operations.

Number of Participants

104
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Round 2
Round 3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Scale Score
Figure 36. Scale score responses for Question 35.

After two rounds of inquiry, a consensus of opinion could not be reached for this
question. Among those disagreeing or somewhat disagreeing, there was the belief that
states were reluctant to depart from precedents established under international
humanitarian law. This same group believed they would be more inclined to negotiate
cyber warfare treaties once tangible damage had occurred following a cyber attack.
Within the group of respondents who took a neutral position on the question, there was
the opinion that allowing for maximum flexibility was only one of a number of
components in the unwillingness of states to limit their conduct.
Question 36. The inequality of technological capabilities has been a primary
reason why leading cyber states have been unwilling to address legally limiting the use of
cyber weapons.
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Figure 37. Scale score responses for Question 36.

During both rounds of inquiry, a clear majority of respondents scored their
responses as disagree or strongly disagree but an insufficient number did so to establish a
consensus. Among the majority opinion, the scale scores were based on the belief that
the leading powers are also the most susceptible to cyber attack and understand the need
for a treaty. There was also a belief among members of this group that competing
interests and priorities among states have played a role. Among those somewhat agreeing
with the question, there was the belief that a key consideration was states allowing
themselves the most freedom of action as possible. Again for this question, the neutral
opinion was based on the belief that technological superiority was only one of a number
of components in the unwillingness of states to limit their conduct.
Question 37. The exponential growth of technology would most likely leave any
specific cyber warfare legislation obsolete shortly after it was enacted.
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Figure 38. Scale score responses for Question 37.

During both rounds of inquiry, a consensus was reached to disagree or strongly
disagree with the question. Justifications among the consensus centered on the belief that
software technology has changed very little over the last 50 years even with the advent of
digital devices. This was important to them specifically because of their stated belief that
software is by far the most common target of cyber attack. Additionally, it was stated
that cyber attack methods have not changed much over the last 20 years but merely use
the same methods to exploit new vulnerabilities. Two participants responded outside of
the consensus and rated a response of neutral. One was based on the belief that they did
not know the technology well enough to respond while the other felt the question was
very much legislature specific.
Question 38. Any international agreement to limit the use of cyber weapons is
likely to be ignored during an actual conflict by those states capable of using them
effectively; regardless of whether they are a signatory to the treaty.
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Figure 39. Scale score responses for Question 38.

During both rounds of inquiry the consensus of opinion was to disagree or
strongly disagree with the question. Among the consensus, the belief existed that the
question was very much state-specific with some adhering and others not. It was stated
that the reasonableness of the treaty would be a strong determining factor in adherence.
Also, some within the consensus felt that violating international agreements encourages
escalation which most states would want to avoid; especially as the escalations would
likely occur outside of cyberspace. The group of respondents who agreed with the
question felt it was in keeping with state practice and therefore a valid assumption.
Question 39. Preemptive cyber attacks can be morally justified if the evidence
exceeds a 90% likelihood of armed attack and that the provocation is expected to cause a
high degree of damage or casualties.
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Figure 40. Scale score responses for Question 39.

After two rounds of inquiry, no consensus could be reached among the
participants. Half of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the question.
Their opinions were based primarily on the belief that the scenario met the requirements
of anticipatory self-defense under the laws of armed conflict. Conversely, those strongly
disagreeing with the question believed that the laws of armed conflict only allow for
preemptive attacks on a very rare basis. They felt that window was even narrower for
cyber attacks because of additional difficulties with assessing danger and adversary
preparations. During round three, 2 participants who were previously neutral on the
question moved to the opinion of slightly disagree because of this argument. During
round three, they felt it would require a case-by-case review. Neutral opinions varied
from questions as to whether morally justified attacks are any different from legally
justified ones and with the use of 90% as the trigger.
Question 40. States have an obligation to defend their citizens from cyber attacks
even to the extent of using some illegal or unethical means to do so.
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Figure 41. Scale score responses for Question 40.

The consensus of opinion for both rounds of inquiry was to disagree or strongly
disagree with the premise. For many in the consensus, it came down to the belief that
one can not commit a crime in order to defend themselves from another. Neutral
opinions centered on the idea that the question may be true based on the effects of the
cyber attacks and specifically their potential to cause great harm and destruction. The
individual who agreed with the premise considered it the state’s duty to defend its
citizens even if the minimum necessary response exceeded legal or ethical standards.
Question 41. Each state has an affirmative duty to formally review the legality of
any cyber weapon and operation prior to its deployment.
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Figure 42. Scale score responses for Question 41.

During both rounds of inquiry, all respondents took a positive view of the
question with the consensus being to agree or strongly agree. It was widely believed that
the assertion was consistent with international humanitarian law. It was further justified
based on the belief that the complexity of cyber weapons raises many collateral damage
issues that are not obvious at the onset of an operation.
Question 42. Each state has an affirmative duty to continuously monitor their
cyber attacks, when feasible, so as to cancel or suspend an attack if conditions change
such as posing a threat to the civilian population.
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Figure 43. Scale score responses for Question 42.

For both rounds of inquiry, there was a consensus of opinion to agree or strongly
agree with the question. Responses to this question centered on the belief that it was
consistent with international humanitarian law with two respondents equating it to the
obligation of damage assessment after a kinetic strike such as with a missile or aerial
bombing. Neutral opinions were based on the belief that the requirement is only to
consider the possibility while planning rather than actively monitoring during the
operation. It was further stated that the continuous monitoring of a cyber attack may be
impossible if it severs or interferes with communications.
Results for Research Question 1
The first research question being investigated was at what point do computer virus
attacks elevate to the level of use of force or armed attack under international law.
Almost unanimously, the respondents found that comparing the scope and effect of a
cyber attack to a kinetic attack was an effective formula for determining whether it
reached the point of use of force or armed attack under international law. There was also
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a strong consensus of opinion that a use of force or armed attack designation could be
assigned collectively to multiple cyber attacks committed over a short period.
The target of a cyber attack was also deemed to be of importance by the
participants when determining a use of force or armed attack designation. A strong
majority of the respondents felt that targeting critical national infrastructure was merely
one factor in determining a use of force designation and not sufficient in and of itself.
Additionally, the consensus of opinion was that the significant loss of any single
computerized system was not sufficient enough for a use of force designation but would
most likely be deemed a violation of sovereignty. In terms of system manipulation, the
consensus of opinion among the respondents was that changing the functionality of a
system is a form of damage since functionality of a system is part of its integrity.
Because of this viewpoint, the participants believed that altering the data or functionality
of a system may allow for an armed attack designation as damage need not be physical.
This idea was expanded upon by the near unanimous opinion that cyber attacks that lead
to physical damage such as that which occurred at the Natanz nuclear facility could also
lead to an armed attack designation.
Another area that also received a strong consensus of opinion was the belief that
the intent of the attacker and not just the results should be taken into account when
making an armed attack designation. This can be seen in the results to Question 10,
where most of the respondents agreed that a cyber attack foiled by passive defenses may
still be designated an armed attack if it would have caused serious damage or loss of life.
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Results for Research Question Two
The second research question asked what limitations exist with initial and reprisal
cyber attack targeting. The consensus of opinion of the respondents was that cyber
weapons were not illegal under international law and that they met the requirements for
reasonable control and accountability of use. The consensus of opinion was also that any
response to a cyber attack need not remain in cyberspace in order to meet the
requirements of proportionality. Lastly, the participants unanimously found that the
requirement for necessity was not hindered by the fact that any reprisal would most likely
not alleviate the ongoing effects of the initial cyber attack.
During the first round of inquiry, the idea that each state had a positive duty to
formally review all cyber weapons and operations prior to their use was posited. It was
also stated that each state had an obligation to continuously monitor their cyber attacks
whenever possible and suspend them if civilians were endangered. In both cases, the
participants reached a consensus to agree with these concepts. Conversely, the
respondents were primarily neutral or slightly disagreed with the idea that any malware
that could not be controlled after deployment would be illegal under international law.
The opinion of the consensus was based, among other things, on the belief that
international law only requires states to consider the possibility of collateral damage
rather than eliminate it entirely.
Questions about perfidy and the targeting of non-combatants were also discussed
by the participants of this study. The legality of masking a cyber weapon to look like
legitimate civilian traffic was a particular point of contention. While a majority of
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respondents disagreed with the notion that masking the cyber weapon would violate the
prohibition against perfidy, a consensus of opinion could not be reached. Even more
contentious was whether masking the cyber weapon to look like the communication of a
protected organization such as the United Nations or International Red Cross would be
illegal. In this case, only one more contributor felt it would not be illegal than took the
opposing view. Although some respondents disagreed, the consensus of opinion was that
accepting the premise that no civilian or government target had full legal protection from
cyber attacks would violate jus cogens and lead to abuses. A similar scenario existed
whereby, with few objections, the participants reached a consensus of opinion that noncombatants forfeited their protections if they directly engaged in cyber operations
regardless of whether they were government employees or not.
As a cyber attack may go unnoticed for a considerable amount of time, and there
are additional questions with attribution involving cyber attacks, the requirement of
immediacy was strongly debated by the participants. A slight majority of the respondents
felt that predicating immediacy on the time reasonable attribution had been made rather
than on when the effects were detected would not be legal under international law.
Conversely, those arguing in favor of the proposal felt this would allow states ample time
to establish reasonable attribution and mitigate the possibility of responding against the
wrong state or actor. The question of reasonable attribution is significant in that all
respondents agreed to some extent that tracing a cyber attack to a foreign state-owned
computer system is not sufficient enough evidence to attribute the attack. The need for
reasonable attribution was limited by the consensus of opinion that cyber attacks may be
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launched for defensive purposes under the guise of necessity even with the identity of the
aggressor is unknown.
A number of issues concerning anticipatory self-defense and active defense
systems were also discussed by the participants. The consensus of opinion was that the
legal concept of anticipatory self-defense applies to cyber attacks in the same way they
do kinetic attacks. Furthermore, the consensus of opinion included the belief that the
cyber attack need not be part of a larger attack encompassing a campaign outside of
cyberspace. Half of the participants also felt that a preemptive cyber attack could be
morally justified if there was a high probability that the impending attack would cause
large scale damage or casualties. Lastly, the participants reached a consensus of opinion
that states may not use illegal or unethical means to defend their citizens from cyber
attacks.
Results for Research Question 3
The third research question investigated the effects of the unique nature of cyber
warfare on the traditional idea of state neutrality. Two areas concerning the use of
neutral state communication systems to conduct cyber attacks failed to meet with a
consensus of opinion. The first disagreement lied with whether a neutral state has an
obligation to disrupt the use of its communication infrastructure if it is aware that it is
being used to conduct cyber attacks. Most respondents to this question took a neutral
opinion or only slightly agreed or disagreed with the premise. Some felt that this would
be an undue burden on the neutral state while others felt that failure to do so could cause
the state to forfeit its neutrality. One of the issues unique to cyber warfare that was
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debated was, whether the transfer of network data could be considered a cyber attack or
merely communication.
The second question that the participants could not come to consensus of opinion
on was, whether a state may legally attack the communication infrastructure of a neutral
state if the neutral state was unwilling or unable to halt its use. During the second round
of inquiry, a clear majority opinion was to agree that combatants do have the right to
disable the infrastructure in neutral states. While this belief remained the majority
opinion during the third round of inquiry the number of participants agreeing with it fell
as some moved towards a neutral opinion.
Among the questions of neutrality that the respondents were able to find
consensus was the inability to designate cyberspace a global commons. The idea that a
cyber-global commons might eliminate questions of neutrality was soundly defeated by
the participants. The participants agreed that the current composition of network
infrastructure made such a global commons designation problematic at best and that
labeling cyberspace a global commons would not eliminate questions of sovereignty over
its physical components.
A final area of consensus was found in the belief that the mere transfer of a cyber
weapon over a neutral states communication system did not cause that state to forfeit its
neutrality. This belief stemmed from the recognition of redundancies in network
communications that would make it difficult to route a cyber attack through a specific
path. It was also a belief of some of the participants that the packets carrying the cyber
weapon was a form of communication rather than a weapon itself.
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Results for Research Question 4
The final research question asked what impediments currently exist in the
development of legal limitations on cyber warfare. During the first round of inquiry, a
number of ideas were posited to explain this but, by the end of the third round most of
these ideas had been dismissed. A slight majority of respondents felt that the use of
customary law was limited in the development of a cyber warfare regime. Even among
this group there was a belief that the issues surrounding the growth of customary cyber
warfare law were temporary ones that will be resolved in time. At the same time, the
participants soundly disagreed with the idea that customary law was the only way such a
regime will emerge. Many of the participants recognized that the growth in international
cybercrime laws pointed to increased willingness to establish legal limitations on cyber
warfare. They further posited that this could be accomplished through difficult
negotiations but, it would not occur in the near term because of conflicting national
agendas.
The contributors to this study soundly rejected the notion that the growth in cyber
warfare technologies will limit the applicability of any cyber warfare limitations. This
belief is documented with the results of Question 37 whereby none or the respondents
agreed that technological changes would leave any such legal limitations obsolete. A
majority of participants further stated that the inequality of growth in cyber warfare
technology is also not a source of restriction on the development of cyber warfare
legislation. This belief is demonstrated by the results of Question 36 which showed the
respondents disagreeing with this premise by a 2 to 1 margin.
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The most contested opinion was whether states have intentionally avoided
limiting their cyber warfare options in order to allow for maximum flexibility. During
the second round of inquiry, the participants were equally divided on this query. By the
end of the third round, a larger number disagreed than agreed with the notion but, it was
far below the threshold established for consensus.
Summary
In this chapter, the beliefs of 16 scholars in the fields of international law and
cyber warfare were documented with the stated goal of finding a consensus as to the
legality of cyber warfare under international law. The methodology and protocols used
were specifically designed for three reasons. First, so that these scholars’ own words
could be utilized in developing the questionnaires, second, to provide feedback as to the
beliefs of all the participants after each round of inquiry, and lastly, to allow respondents
the ability to both rate their responses on a Likert-type scale as well as justify them in
writing; all through an anonymous process.
The first round of inquiry consisted of a questionnaire composed of nine openended questions. The results for this questionnaire were entered into QSR Nvivo to aid in
the identification of themes for the preparation of subsequent questionnaires. These
questionnaires consisted of 42 questions that allowed the participants to rank their
responses on a Likert-type scale and justify them using written responses. After both the
second and third rounds of inquiry, feedback in the form of figures showing the
cumulative scale scores and summaries of the given narratives were provided to each
participant. This feedback played not only an important role in developing the results of
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the study but also as a tool for data verification and establishing the trustworthiness of the
results.
The following chapter will interpret the results of this study, detail the limitations
of it, and provide recommendations for further research into the topic.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to reach a consensus as to the current standing of
cyber warfare under international law and to recommend changes to the law whenever
possible. Because of the broad scope of what encompasses cyber warfare, the research
was delimited to a study of cyber attacks. Additionally, the unique nature of cyber
warfare has left much ambiguity as to when cyber activities rise to the level of use of
force or armed attack under international law. This categorization under the law is
important to determine what cyber actions and reactions are both legal and appropriate.
Failure to clearly make this determination may lead states to commit acts of cyber
adventurism that result in severe damage or loss of life.
The research methodology for this study consisted of a Delphi method of
qualitative inquiry. The use of the Delphi method allowed for three separate rounds of
inquiry among 18 scholars in the fields of international law and cyber warfare. During
each round, the identities of the contributors were kept strictly confidential with the only
feedback provided by the researcher. With the first round, the participants answered
open-ended questions in order to assist in developing the questions for the subsequent
surveys. With the second and third rounds of inquiry, the respondents ranked their
opinions on a Likert-type scale and provided a brief justification for their scores. In
between each round, and at the end of the study, the results were shared with each
participant to allow them to be aware of their colleagues’ opinions and to refine their own.

121
In the previous chapter, the results of the questionnaires were presented. In this
chapter, the findings are interpreted and evaluated for their limitations, recommendations
for further research, as well as their implications and potential for social change.
Interpretations, Limitations, and Recommendations
In this section, a succinct interpretation of the findings for this research is
provided. These results are compared to those of the scholarly works represented in the
literature review in an attempt to fill gaps in the existing literature. Additionally, the
limitations of the study are concisely demarked and addressed through recommendations
for further research. The limitations and recommendations include not only the findings,
but multiple aspects of the methodology such as the method of inquiry, participant
population pool, and the theoretical framework.
Review and Recommendations for Research Question 1
Determining whether a computer attack has risen to the level of use of force or
armed attack under international law was a key component of this study.
Overwhelmingly, the participants agreed that comparing the scope and effects of a cyber
attack to those of a kinetic attack was appropriate for making this determination. Only
one of the respondents disagreed with this notion and did so because they felt it did not
eliminate the possibility that what was perceived as an attack was in actuality
coincidental. Some scholars have developed models to measure the characteristics of
cyber attacks against those of kinetic attacks. For example, the model developed by
Schmitt (1998) uses a quantitative scale in which to calculate the severity, immediacy,
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directness, invasiveness, measurability, presumptive legitimacy, and the responsibility for
the cyber attack.
The use of models like the one developed by Schmitt, would seemingly support
the consensus of opinion of the participants in this study, but not all scholars agree with
this premise. One expert who disagrees with this approach is Barkham (2001) who sees
it as flawed for attempting to determine the legality of a cyber attack based on the attack
rather than based on the law. Barkham further sees a flaw with trying to assess a cyber
attack during, or immediately after the event, as the full effects are often unknown during
this timeframe. Current international law assumes that an armed attack will have
physical limitations in time and space (Rho, 2007). However, some scholars believe this
does not hold true if a cyber attack is to be designated a use of force or armed attack
(Jurich, 2008).
As the model used for determining whether a cyber attack has risen to the level of
use of force or armed attack is of paramount importance, further studies should be
conducted in this area. Specifically, studies that review existing models for their
applicability and determine what characteristics these models should measure are needed.
While the participants in this study clearly favored measuring cyber attacks against
kinetic attacks when making a use of force or armed attack distinction, a determination as
to whether existing models are appropriate for doing so should be further studied.
During the course of this study, a majority of participants determined that the
targeting of critical national infrastructure was in itself insufficient to make a use of force
determination. Instead, these respondents felt that the target was only a singular factor in
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making such a determination. This opinion contradicts the beliefs of both Jensen (2002)
and Hollis (2007) with the later listing the targeting of critical infrastructure as one of
three potential criteria for making a use of force determination. Considering that a
consensus of opinion could not be reached during this study, and that additional scholars
have contradicted the view of the majority, the question as to whether the targeting of
critical infrastructure is sufficient to make a use of force claim remains unsettled.
Supplementary research should be conducted in an attempt to both definitively answer
this question and to determine specifically what infrastructure would fall into this
category.
The laws of war have traditionally distinguished between the use of force and
armed attack based on the physical effects of the attack (Schmitt, 1999). The use of the
physical effects has been shown to be problematic when attempting to evaluate cyber
attacks (Jurich, 2008). One potential solution to this problem debated by the participants
of this study was the classification of data manipulation as physical damage. A
consensus of opinion was reached among the contributors that altering data or the
functionality of a system should be considered physical damage and, therefore, warranted
of an armed attack distinction. Their opinion was based in part on the belief that
changing the functionality of a system is a form of damage since the functionality of a
system is part of its integrity. While a consensus of opinion was reached among the
participants of this study, potentially addressing the problem in this fashion needs to be
researched further in order to meet the confirmability of results.
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Silver (2002) stated that for a cyber attack to be considered a use of force the
attack must have intended to cause a result similar to a kinetic attack. The participants in
this study took this premise one step further by reaching a consensus of opinion that a
failed cyber attack that would have caused severe damage or loss of life would also be
considered an armed attack. As with Silver, the respondents agreed that the intention of
the aggressor was a sufficient criterion with one contributor likening it to a missile falling
short of its target. Opinions like these hold greater weight with cyber warfare as cyber
weapons are typically no more reliable today than in the past and tend to have a higher
rate of failure than conventional weapons (Neumann, 1995; Rowe 2009).
The participants of this study made one final decision in relation to designating a
cyber attack a use of force or armed attack. A consensus was met that such a designation
would be possible to a collective string of attacks even when each individual attack fails
to meet the necessary criteria. The question among those participants that disagreed with
this premise was how to determine the starting and ending points when evaluating the
cumulative effects. The consensus of opinion for this question potentially has far
reaching consequences and needs to be investigated further. Additional research as to the
validity of the opinion expressed here and an acceptable formula for determining the
duration that can be evaluated when making a use of force or armed attack designation is
needed.
Review and Recommendations for Research Question Two
International law requires states to maintain reasonable control over their weapons
and be held accountable for their use (Lucas, 2010). It also makes the continuation of
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hostilities after a party has surrendered illegal. Some scholars such as Rowe (2009) have
stated that cyber weapons might not meet these minimum requirements and especially if
the weapon is designed to obstruct communications as part of its function. While
discussing the legitimacy of cyber weapons, the participants of this study came to a
consensus of opinion that the minimum necessary controls currently exist. Two
respondents objected to this viewpoint stating that cyber weapons require more stringent
controls then kinetic weapons and therefore may not be legal in their current state. The
question of control after the release of a cyber weapon was more contested and failed to
reach a consensus. The majority view was that controlling a cyber weapon after it is
deployed is not required but merely to consider the possibility for collateral damage and
to minimize the likelihood. Additionally, it was stated that if a cyber attack remained
within military systems a lack of control over the weapon would not be a concern.
Because questions of control over cyber weapons may affect the legitimate use of certain
types of cyber weapons, further research into this question will need to be conducted.
When asked about a state’s affirmative duty to formally review the legality of any
cyber weapon or cyber operation the respondents unanimously agreed that it was a
requirement under international humanitarian law. Similarly, a clear consensus of
opinion among the respondents was reached to agree that all states have an affirmative
duty to monitor and cancel attacks whenever feasible if they pose a threat to the civilian
population. The remaining participants believed it was only a requirement to consider the
possibility during planning and that it would be an undue burden to continually monitor
an attack especially if the attack severed communication.
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Under jus ad bellum, a state must have proportionality, necessity, and immediacy
when responding to an act of aggression. In Nicaragua v. The United States, the
International Court of Justice laid down three specific conditions to justify a proportional
attack. The third criterion given was that the responding state must do so in a manner
proportional to the offending state’s actions (Jensen, 2002). To investigate this further,
the participants of this study discussed whether this condition requires that states only
respond to a cyber attack in cyber space. The consensus of opinion was that the
requirement for proportionality only required a proportionality of effects regardless of the
means. Two contributors objected to this opinion stating that cyber warfare is too
different from traditional warfare to accept this premise. While the respondents
overwhelming agreed that a response to a cyber attack may occur with kinetic weaponry,
a lack of studies into the topic will require the results to be confirmed through additional
research.
When arguing necessity, just war theorists evaluate military operations based on
whether the goal of the action could be achieved by other means that would not result in
injury or death (Baer, 2005). This belief has led some scholars to debate whether the just
war theory would allow for preemptive attacks. Certain scholars have accepted that a
narrowly defined right of intervention does not run contrary to the just war theory
(Primoratz, 2002). In an effort to delineate one of the boundaries of the right of
intervention, the participants of this study debated Dilbert’s (2009) assertion that a
preemptive attack could be deemed morally justified if the likelihood of armed attack
exceeded 90% and the attack was expected to cause a high degree of damage. At the
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conclusion of this study, no consensus of opinion could be reached on this question. Half
of the respondents agreed with Dilbert’s assertion based on the belief that it met the
guidelines of anticipatory self-defense under the laws of armed conflict. The remaining
respondents took either a neutral opinion based on the need to evaluate it on a case by
case basis or disagreed because of a belief that the right to anticipatory self-defense is
more limited in cyber space.
Schmitt (1999) has argued that a preemptive cyber attack cannot be initiated to
stave off an impending cyber event unless the cyber event is to be part of a greater armed
assault. While rejecting this proposition, the participants of this study reached a
consensus of opinion with just two dissentions. Those in the consensus agreed that the
modality of an armed attack is inconsequential as a cyber attack that reaches the level of
armed attack is no different from a kinetic attack that carries the same distinction.
Among those outside of the consensus, there was a concern about the additional issues
with attribution that occur during cyber warfare. The question of attribution was further
explored by the respondents of this study. In doing so, they reached a consensus of
opinion that a state may launch cyber attacks for defensive purposes in the name of
necessity even when the identity of the attacker is not clearly known. In keeping with the
tenants of the just war theory, some of those in the consensus qualified their response
with the caveat that it was contingent on there being no other way for the state to defend
itself. As with the previous question, 2 contributors disagreed with the consensus. In this
case, they did so based on the belief that attribution requirements could not be weakened
for cyber attacks as the same scenario would be illegal under international law if it were
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done using traditional military means. This belief is in keeping with that espoused by
Cordon (2007) who stated that a victimized state must be able to identify their attacker
and their intention in order to claim necessity. As the participants of this study were able
to reach consensus of opinion over the legality of preemptive cyber attacks, the results
will need to be confirmed through additional research.
To meet the requirement of immediacy, any response to a cyber attack must occur
before too much time has lapsed (Cordon, 2007). While Gill (2006) has noted that the
response need not occur immediately after the attack, a set timeframe or criteria has not
been established. One criterion debated by the participants of this study was whether to
fix the starting period for immediacy on the time that reasonable attribution had been
made. The respondents were nearly equally split on this question with slightly more
disagreeing. The proponents of this concept believed it took into consideration the
additional attribution problems present with cyber warfare. Their opponents maintained
that immediacy must remain with the time the effects are noticed to be legal under
international law. Because the divide between the participants was nearly equal, it is
difficult to make any significant assessment of the results. While current international
law may favor the use of the effects, this may require a reevaluation in order to limit the
use of cyber weapons as suggested by some of the contributors.
Under the just war theory, states must respect the rights of all individuals on both
sides of a conflict equally (Fabre, 2008). When discussing legitimate targets for a cyber
attack, the role of civilians was debated by the participants of this study. A consensus of
opinion was formed that certain population groups always maintain their protections even
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when an overriding military necessity may exist. Walzer (2000) wrote that civilians
forfeit their protections only when they are directly engaged in the business of war such
as working in a munitions factory. Primoratz (2002) expanded upon this definition by
stating that civilians can only forfeit their protections by their own actions. The
contributors to this study accepted this principle unanimously. In doing so, they accepted
that civilians involved in offensive cyber operations have forfeited their protections.
Even though there was unanimous acceptance of the argument, some of the participants
qualified their responses by stating that only offensive cyber operations that cause death
or physical destruction warrant forfeiture of the civilian’s protected status. This
addendum holds significance when coupled with the question of whether data
manipulation or destruction is a form of physical destruction and should be researched
further as part of this question.
The last question over cyber attack targeting covered by this study dealt with
possible acts of perfidy. Perfidy is illegal under international law because it may
encourage states to erroneously or intentionally target civilians (Rowe, 2009). During the
course of the debate over perfidy, it was the consensus of opinion of the participants that
a cyber weapon designed to look like legitimate civilian traffic would not violate this
prohibition. The rationale often cited was that perfidy only covers active agents which
network traffic could not be classified as. Additional justifications were based on the
belief that acts of perfidy require the taking of a life which may not occur with a cyber
attack.
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Review and Recommendations for Research Question 3
One major point of contention over neutrality that exists after the completion of
this study is whether a cyber weapon qualifies as a weapon or merely communication
while being transmitted. The Hague Convention V states that nations involved in an
international conflict may not move weaponry or military supplies across the territory of
a neutral state. The same convention also states that neutral nations have no obligation to
disrupt the military communications of warring states that utilize their communication
networks. Whether the requirements of Hague V apply solely to traditional
communication networks that send and receive data or also digital networks that can also
create data is still a matter of much debate (Kelsey, 2008). Various scholars, such as
Greenberg (1998) and Brown (2006), take the opinion that the transmission of a cyber
weapon over a neutral state’s communication system would violate that state’s neutrality.
This belief would seemingly draw the neutral state into the conflict as neutral states are
required under international law to resist any attempted violations of their sovereignty
(Kelsey, 2008).
For some of the participants of this study, a cyber weapon was a program running
on a computer and not the communications that transmitted it or controlling it. Others
viewed the cyber weapon as both the program and the communication. Regardless, of
which classification the respondents used all agreed to some extent that neutral states had
no affirmative duty to disrupt such communication. The key to whether a neutral state is
required to interrupt the transmission of a cyber weapon may lie in whether it was aware
that its infrastructure was being used. Most participants felt that it was an undue burden
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for the neutral state to continuously monitor their networks for such communications.
Once the question turned to the disruption of known communication, the majority of
scholars turned neutral on the question or slightly agreed that states are required to
disrupt the communication. It should be noted that those scholars whose primary
background is in cyber warfare were more inclined to believe that the communication
was a weapon and that the neutral state is obligated to disrupt the communication.
Another area that showed a clear divergence of opinion between the cyber warfare
and international law scholars who participated in this study is whether a state may act
forcefully against a neutral state which is unable or unwilling to disrupt the use of its
communication systems. Those with a cyber warfare background tended to believe that
the right to act was keeping with the laws of neutrality. Conversely, those whose primary
background was in international law were more likely to disagree. While a consensus of
opinion could not be reached for this question, a majority supported a state’s right to
physically intervene against a neutral party. Because the views of scholars differ greatly
as to the obligations of neutral states, what cyber actions would violate the state’s
neutrality, and what right of reprisal exists, more research and discussion needs to be
conducted in this area. Since views often very based on the background of the
respondent, any such studies need to clearly demarcate the education and professional
experience of all participants.
Review and Recommendations for Research Question 4
The results for research Question 4 did little to determine the root cause for the
delay in legislation specifically targeting the limitation of cyber warfare operations. It
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did however potentially abolish some causes. Possible reasons such as the rapid growth
in technology and the inequality of that growth were discussed and eliminated by the
respondents of this study. This view contradicts that of Walker (2000) who dismissed the
appropriateness of cyber-specific legislation based on the belief that the growth in
technology would leave such laws obsolete. Some of the participants in this study
disregarded this notion because they believed that software technology had changed very
little over the last 50 years and was unlikely to do so in the near future.
One area of disagreement that should be investigated further was whether
maintaining maximum flexibility to conduct cyber operations was a leading factor in the
failure to develop cyber-specific legal limitations. During the second round of inquiry,
multiple responses were scored for 5 different points on the Likert-type scale. While the
scale scores narrowed to 4 points during the third round, the diversity of opinion shows
the level of disagreement on this point. Other scholars have seemingly taken a more
positive view of this question. Ellis (2001) stated that states were unwilling to limit their
cyber operations because they provided non-lethal methods of attack, and the full
potential of cyber warfare is still not known. Similarly, Kelsey (2008) felt that cyber
weapons would not be limited until they have been fully tested in a real-world conflict in
order to determine the extent of their reach. The debate between the participants of this
study centered on the present rather than the future so, little was discussed about the
future potential of cyber weapons. Additional research into this specific rationale
therefore, may be needed.
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Kelsey (2008) wrote that numerous governments, including some cyber powers,
believe that current laws are sufficient to cover cyber operations and have resisted any
attempts at additions or modifications to the law. This concept was not discussed among
the participants of this study and should be investigated further. Some of the respondents
felt that states like China and Russia had made public statements supporting the creation
of cyber-specific legislation but, other participants dismissed the legitimacy of their
statements. The view among these contributors was that the statements were made solely
for public consumption and that China and Russia are likely two of the most active states
in terms of ongoing cyber operations.
While not eliminating the potential for the development of customary law in the
field of cyber warfare, the results of this study showed a propensity of opinion that such
legal limitations will result instead from negotiated treaties. It is believed that customary
law has been based on state practice, resolutions, and declarations (Meron, 1996) but here
too we see a difference of opinion as Ochoa (2007) disagrees with the assertion that it is
based on the beliefs and actions of the state. While no consensus of opinion was
achieved with this study, the majority opinion of the participants was to accept Meron’s
standard and find that the secrecy revolving around cyber operations limited the potential
development of customary law in this area.
Another area that was not specifically addressed in this study is whether the time
involved in the development of customary law was excessive. Schmitt (1999) has
previously taken the view that customary law is impractical for addressing cyber
operations specifically because of the time involved. Other scholars such as Kelly (2000)
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view custom as no longer relevant in the development of international law. This notion
may be visible with the development of what has been termed modern customary law that
relies on the state’s statement of practice rather than an analysis of its actual behavior
(Bodansky 1995; Roberts, 2001). This view has led some scholars to see modern
customary law as an offshoot of universal declaratory law rather than a progression in
customary law (Bodansky, 1995). Considering that the participants of this study did not
reach a consensus of opinion to dismiss customary law as insufficient for the
development of a cyber warfare regime, future research may need to be specifically
address whether time limitations that have traditionally occurred in the development of
customary law are appropriate in this case.
According to Cody (2002), the reality of modern international law is that it is
negotiated, ratified, and implemented in a short period time. Fortunately, one area that
did receive a consensus of opinion during this study is that any negotiated settlement that
is deemed reasonable by all signatories will most likely be adhered to in times of
transnational conflict. These results may point to a belief that negotiated settlement is
superior to customary law in terms of the length required in its development as well as its
reception and adherence among the international community.
Limitations and Recommendations in the Methodology
This study was limited to the opinions of 18 scholars in the fields of international
law and cyber warfare. It was further confined to scholars fluent in English and residing
in English speaking countries. This limitation gave the results a slant towards an
occidental viewpoint in terms of ethics and the interpretation of the law. The ethos of the
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just war theory has also been the product of an evolution in Western ethics. By using the
just war theory as a theoretical framework, the moral outlook of many states are left
unexplored. Therefore, future research should attempt to gauge the opinions of scholars
from other cyber powers such as China and Russia. As the most likely scenario for the
development of cyber-specific laws of war will require negotiation with such powers, it is
imperative that the vantage point of scholars and experts in these states be explored
thoroughly.
Limitations also exist with the use of the just war theory as a theoretical
framework. There is a concern among some scholars about the practicality of using the
just war theory to judge cyber warfare either morally or legally (Dipert, 2006) as well as
to evaluate the military aspects of cyber warfare (Lucas, 2010). Because of these
reservations, additional research should attempt to employ divergent theoretical
frameworks.
Additional limitations in the research exist with the delimiting of the study solely
to cyber attacks. Focusing only on cyber attacks was deemed necessary at the onset of
the research in order to scale the study to an appropriate and feasible size. In order to
fully evaluate cyber warfare under international law, and make logical assumptions as to
its future development, other forms of cyber warfare such as cyber exploitation will need
to be researched and taken into consideration.
The Potential Role of the Participant’s Backgrounds in the Results
Individuals involved in the development of cyber weapons tend to come from
computer software backgrounds and are not as limited as those in traditional military
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industries (Perry, 2009). Working primarily in the world of information technology is
further given as a rationale for the more indiscriminate planning of operations against
civilian infrastructure by the cyber warfare community (Lucas, 2010). The results for
only three of the questions posed during the course of this study would appear to support
this assertion.
Of the 16 participants that completed all three rounds of inquiry, 9 came from a
background predominately in international law and 7 from a background predominately
in information technology. Among those with an information technology background,
there was a tendency at times during this study for some of them to take a more
aggressive approach to cyber warfare operations. One example of this trend can be seen
with Question 19. This question stated “No target, civilian or government, has complete
legal protection from a cyber attack if there is an overriding military necessity.” Only 2
respondents took a positive view of the premise of this question while the most common
score was to strongly disagree. In this case, both of those agreeing came from
information technology backgrounds. For Question 3, which stated “A state may legally
disable or destroy network infrastructure in a neutral country if the neutral country is
unable or unwilling to stop the use of its equipment to route cyber attacks” no consensus
of opinion was reached. Trends for this question though showed those with information
technology backgrounds almost unanimously agreed with the premise while those with
international law backgrounds primarily disagreed. Lastly, with Question 40, “States
have an obligation to defend their citizens from cyber attacks even to the extent of using
some illegal or unethical means to do so,” the sole agreeing vote and one of the two

137
neutral opinions came from those with information technology backgrounds. The
remainder of the participants disagreed or strongly disagreed.
While this study could not validate the points raised by Perry and Lucas, it did
seemingly show an opposite effect. For a number of questions, the only, or nearly all of
the views outside of the consensus or majority opinion and which supported more
stringent controls on cyber warfare were made by those with international law
backgrounds. This phenomenon occurred with Questions 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20,
21, and 22. With these questions, the fringe opinions were made almost solely by those
with international law backgrounds and in opposition of the beliefs held by their
counterparts from both the information technology and international law fields. While
the population size used for this study is too small to make any definitive claims based on
these results, they do point to additional questions that need to be researched further.
First, has the belief that cyber weapon designers and operational planners are more
inclined to target traditionally protected objectives been overstated? Second, has a trend
occurred within the cyber warfare community to more readily accept that existing
international laws and norms apply to cyber warfare and have planned accordingly?
Lastly, is there a strong difference of opinion among international law scholars when
attempting to judge cyber warfare against traditional methods of warfare, rather than a
divide between the international law and cyber warfare communities?
Implications
This study has important potential implications for state and non-state actors alike.
However, because of the intransigence of many leading cyber powers, it remains chiefly
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theoretical at this point. The reasoning for these pertinacious states still remains a point
of contention even at the conclusion of this research. Most likely, it is a result of
numerous factors that vary based on individual state beliefs and agendas. Regardless of
their justification, the lack of cyber-specific limitations under the laws of war may well
result in the commission of acts of war that otherwise could have been avoided. The
basis for cyber-specific legislation under the laws of war can begin to be addressed by
using the results of this and other related studies. Therefore, the findings contained here
may help to serve as an initial point of negotiation for the international community.
State-sponsored cyber attacks have most likely already occurred. For the most
part, they have been unassuming in their scope and led to little in the way of tangible
damage or known deaths. This includes attacks attributed to Russia on the Estonian and
Georgian governments and the Stuxnet virus attack on the Natanz nuclear facility which
is most commonly blamed on Israel and the United States. As the attack on Natanz
demonstrates, some states may have already become willing to escalate the use of cyber
weapons and increase their destructiveness where they otherwise wouldn’t with
traditional kinetic attacks. Because of this, the major social implication of this study is to
bring about greater attention and debate to the issue of legal limitations on cyber warfare.
In doing so, it is hoped that the results of this study will hasten the development of a
cyber warfare regime that will mitigate the damage and loss of life that may occur from a
cyber attack.
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Conclusion
To date, limitations specific to cyber warfare have failed to develop at the
necessary pace and scope. To fill this void, states have taken different approaches in
making their own interpretations as to what constitutes a legal action under international
law. Additionally, some states have refused to negotiate cyber specific limitations
claiming that current laws are sufficient while others make public declarations about their
own cyber policies as they allegedly violate them. The potential for indiscriminate death
and destruction that this situation presents needs to be overcome in the short term and
will most likely require intense negotiation among the leading cyber powers. Towards
this end, the purpose of this study is to fill a gap in the literature as identified in Chapter 2
and serve as a source document for greater debate and action in this area.
Through the use of the Delphi method of inquiry, 18 scholars in the fields of
international law and cyber warfare debated numerous issues over three rounds of inquiry
to assist in filling the gap in the current literature. A consensus of opinion, measured by
80% of responses being within 2 points on a 7-point Likert-type scale was met for many
of the questions evaluated. These results sometimes served to confirm those opinions
expressed in the literature review while others went in different directions and added to
the existing literature. Perhaps most telling were areas of disagreement, such as to the
criteria needed to make a use of force or armed attack designation for a cyber attack or
how best to measure these criteria. It was with these questions that the current divide in
viewpoints was most evident. These questions are also the requisite starting point for
debate and deliberation at the nation-state level if the goal of a regime designed to limit
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the use of cyber weapons is to emerge. The social change implications of such state
action could lead to the protection of countless lives and property that are currently
exposed to risk of cyber attack.
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Appendix A: Consent Form
Participant Consent Form
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted to determine the legality of
deploying computer viruses against specific military, civilian and dual-use targets under
various international laws. The researcher is inviting adult scholars and professionals
with a background in cyber warfare and international law to participate in the study.
Participants are being selected based on their expertise in these fields which have given
them the necessary knowledge and experience to make sound determinations of where
they believe existing international laws have applicability and where a lack of coverage
exists. It is the intent of this study to find a consensus of opinion among the participants
and to document the individual justifications for opinions outside of the consensus.
This study is being conducted by a researcher named Kenneth Gualtier, who is a doctoral
student at Walden University. The researcher is employed as a college faculty member at
another institution and this study is separate from that role. Please note that while the
researcher is not an agent of the United States government, he is ethically bound to report
any information about illegal activities uncovered during the course of this study to the
proper authorities.
Background Information:
The purpose of this study is to reach a consensus as to the current standing of cyber
warfare under international law and to recommend changes to the law as needed. The use
of cyber warfare is largely unregulated by international law and the applicability of
current laws may be a matter of some debate. At the same time the majority of cyber
weapons are designed to target civilian and dual-use industries. This creates a great risk
for the loss of civilian lives and property in the event of a large scale cyber operation. By
more clearly defining what limitations may exist under current international law, and
finding consensus among scholars in the field as to what limitations are needed on cyber
weapons to bring them in line with the existing confines on kinetic attacks, we can begin
to address the legality of cyber warfare and therefore, potentially save lives and property.
Procedures:
If you agree to be in this study you will be asked to:
 Respond in writing as described in the Statement of Consent below within five
days of receipt of this consent form agreeing to participate.
 Complete a nine-question narrative questionnaire and return it to the researcher
within two weeks.
 Complete two subsequent questionnaires using a Lykert-type scale and return
them to the researcher within ten days.
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It is expected that five to seven days will be needed between each round of
enquiry to allow the researcher to compile data and perform other administrative
functions.
It is expected that the cumulative total for all three rounds of enquiry, and the time
between rounds, will last approximately seven weeks.

An example of a narrative question from the first questionnaire is “What limitations exist
with proportionality, necessity, and immediacy in order for a state to claim self-defense
under international law, once the state falls victim to a computer virus attack directed at
state, commercial, or civilian infrastructure?”
Voluntary Nature of the Study:
This study is voluntary. Everyone will respect your decision of whether or not you
choose to be in the study. No one at Walden University or your place of business will
treat you differently if you decide not to be in the study. If you decide to join the study
now, you can still change your mind later. You may stop at any time.
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:
Being in this type of study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be
encountered in daily life, especially with the first round of enquiry, such as those
involved with sitting at a computer terminal and typing detailed responses to posed
questions. Being in this study would not pose risk to your safety or wellbeing.
By utilizing a Delphi method with this study all participants will be able to see the
(anonymous) opinions of their colleagues as well as their justifications for opinions
outside of the consensus. This will allow you to possibly refine your own opinions after
each round of enquiry. At the conclusion of the study, a consensus of beliefs will have
been established for all participants that you can apply to your own research or
employment.
Payment:
Your participation in this study will not result in the issuance of financial payment or
gifts.
Privacy:
Any information you provide will be kept confidential. The researcher will not use your
personal information for any purposes outside of this research project. Also, the
researcher will not include your name or anything else that could identify you in the
study reports. Data will be kept secure by retaining all files on a password-protected
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computer and within encrypted compression files. Data will be kept for a period of at
least 5 years, as required by the university.
Contacts and Questions:
You may ask any questions you have now. Or if you have questions later, you may
contact the researcher via e-mail at XXXXXXXXXX. If you want to talk privately about
your rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden
University representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 612-3121210. Walden University’s approval number for this study is 02-2414-0140351 and it expires on February 23, 2015. Please print or save this consent form
for your records.
Statement of Consent:
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a
decision about my involvement. By replying to this email with the words, “I consent”, I
understand that I am agreeing to the terms described above.
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Appendix B: Questionnaire 1
Information Operations under International Law
Questionnaire One
Please complete and return this questionnaire to Kenneth Gualtier at XXXXX no later than
April 13, 2014. In consideration of your time, you may use bullet statements or short
phrases and respond directly under the questions listed below.

Question 1: Under what circumstances might the use of a computer virus by a foreign
government against state, commercial, or civilian targets constitute a “use of force” under
the United Nations charter?
Question 2: Under what circumstances might the use of a computer virus by a foreign
government against state, commercial, or civilian targets constitute an “armed attack”
under the United Nations charter?
Question 3: What limitations exist with proportionality, necessity, and immediacy in
order for a state to claim self-defense under international law, once the state falls victim
to a computer virus attack directed at state, commercial, or civilian infrastructure?
Question 4: In what ways are international laws covering neutrality affected by the
unique nature of cyber warfare? What changes to current laws governing neutrality may
be needed to fully encompass cyber warfare?
Question 5: Under what circumstances might a computer virus attack against commercial
or civilian targets be legal, while the same target is protected from traditional kinetic
attacks under international law?
Question 6: Under what conditions might cyberspace qualify as a global common and
how might such a designation affect the legal use of computer viruses as a means of
cyber warfare under the law?
Question 7: Is the use of customary law sufficient for the development of legal
limitations specifically aimed at cyber warfare? If so, how might such a regime develop?
Question 8: What ethical standards should be taken into consideration when developing
a regime to limit the use of cyber warfare?
Question 9: What factors have contributed to the lack of legal limitations specifically
addressing cyber warfare by the international community?
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Appendix C: Questionnaires 2 and 3
Information Operations under International Law
Please complete and return this questionnaire to Kenneth Gualtier at XXXXXXXXXXX no
later than XXXXXX. After reviewing the results of the second questionnaire, please
reevaluate and score your responses to the statements below. Provide a justification for
responses outside of the consensus or for statements that have not achieved a consensus.

Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Agree
Agree
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECTION A: USE OF FORCE AND ARMED ATTACK DESIGNATIONS

1. An effective formula for determining whether a cyber attack has reached the level of
use of force or armed attack under international law is by comparing its scope and
effect to kinetic attacks.
Scale Score:
Justification:
2. Although a cyber attack may fall below the standard of use of force or armed attack
they most likely would still be deemed illegal under criminal law.
Scale Score:
Justification:
3. To classify a cyber attack as an armed attack under international law the cyber attack
must threaten the territorial integrity or political independence of the offended state.
Scale Score:
Justification:
4. A cyber attack constitutes a use of force whenever it targets critical national
infrastructure.
Scale Score:
Justification:
5. A significant loss of control over a computerized system is serious enough to warrant
a designation of use of force under international law.
Scale Score:
Justification:
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6. Because the STUXNET virus caused severe physical damage to equipment within the
Natanz nuclear facility it would qualify as an armed attack.
Scale Score:
Justification:

7. A use of force or armed attack designation can be assigned collectively to cyber
attacks that reoccur in a short period of time even though the individual attacks do not
warrant this designation.
Scale Score:
Justification:
8. A cyber attack against a major economic entity, such as the New York Stock
Exchange, that results in no loss of life or physical damage may still meet the
requirements of armed attack under international law.
Scale Score:
Justification:
9. A cyber attack that alters data or the functionality of a system, but causes no direct or
indirect physical damage, cannot be classified as an armed attack under international
law.
Scale Score:
Justification:
10. A cyber attack that has been foiled by passive defenses, and which otherwise would
have resulted in serious physical damage or loss of life, may still be categorized as an
armed attack.
Scale Score:
Justification:
SECTION B: PROPORTIONALITY, NECESSITY, IMMEDIACY, AND
ATTRIBUTION
11. For cyber attacks, immediacy should be predicated on the time reasonable attribution
is made rather than when the effects of the attack are detected.
Scale Score:
Justification:
12. Because the STUXNET virus was discovered so long after it began degrading the
equipment in the Natanz nuclear facility, Iran lost the legal right under international
law to respond in self-defense.
Scale Score:
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Justification:
13. The concept of self-defense under international law is problematic when applied to
cyber attacks. The stated point of self-defense, to disarm the attacker, is difficult to
accomplish in cyber space considering that the attacker is most likely not limited to a
specific computer, server, or facility.
Scale Score:
Justification:
14. The law of armed conflict would require that any response to a cyber attack remain in
the cyber arena to meet the obligation for proportionality.
Scale Score:
Justification:
15. Necessity would be difficult to argue in response to a cyber attack, as any response by
the offended state would most likely not curb the ongoing effects of the initial cyber
attack.
Scale Score:
Justification:
16. The fact that a cyber attack has originated from a government operated computer
system is not sufficient enough evidence to attribute the attack to the state nor to take
action against the state.
Scale Score:
Justification:
17. Cyber attacks may be launched for defensive purposes in the name of necessity even
when the identity of the aggressor cannot be clearly attributed.
Scale Score:
Justification:
SECTION C: MEANS AND TARGETS OF CYBER ATTACK
18. The concept of anticipatory self-defense only applies to instances when a cyber attack
is a component of a greater armed assault
Scale Score:
Justification:
19. No target, civilian or government, has complete legal protection from a cyber attack if
there is an overriding military necessity.
Scale Score:
Justification:
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20. A cyber attack, that uses malware that cannot be controlled after being deployed,
would be illegal under international law.
Scale Score:
Justification:
21. To remain legal under international law, cyber-defense systems may not have an
active component that automatically responds to a cyber attack with offensive
measures of its own.
Scale Score:
Justification:
22. Cyber weapons may be illegal under international law because governments cannot
reasonably maintain control over them or be held accountable for their use.
Scale Score:
Justification:
23. Civilians maintain their non-combatant protections under international law even when
directly participating in cyber attacks.
Scale Score:
Justification:
24. A cyber weapon designed to look like legitimate civilian network traffic would
violate the prohibition against perfidy.
Scale Score:
Justification:
25. A cyber weapons designed to look like the legitimate network traffic of an
international organization, such as the United Nations or Red Cross, would be illegal
under international law.
Scale Score:
Justification:
26. It is conceptually impossible to perform an economic blockade solely by cyber means
and, therefore, any denial of service attack against a state’s industries cannot be
labeled as such.
Scale Score:
Justification:
SECTION D: NEUTRALITY
27. The Hague Convention V states that neutral states have no obligation to disrupt
communications passing through their publically accessible communication systems.
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This would not apply to cyber weapons since they are means of attack rather than
communications.
Scale Score:
Justification:
28. Because it would be an undue burden on the citizens of a neutral state to disrupt
network communications in order to stop the use of public systems by states involved
in an armed conflict, the neutral state is under no legal obligation to do so.
Scale Score:
Justification:
29. Because of the redundancy built into networks, and the inability to direct packets
through specific paths, the travelling of packets containing cyber weapons through the
territory of non-belligerents does not violate their neutrality.
Scale Score:
Justification:
30. A state may legally disable or destroy network infrastructure in a neutral country if
the neutral country is unable or unwilling to stop the use of its equipment to route
cyber attacks.
Scale Score:
Justification:
SECTION E: A CYBER GLOBAL COMMONS
31. Because every component of cyber space resides in the sovereign territory of a
nation-state or under its control, an international agreement designating cyber space a
global common is virtually impossible.
Scale Score:
Justification:
32. Designating cyberspace a global common would eliminate any concerns over
neutrality or sovereignty when conducting cyber warfare operations.
Scale Score:
Justification:
SECTION F: ETHICS AND CYBER-SPECIFIC LEGAL LIMITATIONS
33. The use of customary law to develop limitations specific to cyber warfare is restricted
because the secrecy surrounding cyber operations has led to a lack of available state
practice or opinion juris.
Scale Score:
Justification:
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34. Because the leading cyber powers have shown no inclination towards limiting their
cyber warfare potential, the use of customary law is likely the only way to develop
such limitations.
Scale Score:
Justification:
35. States have intentionally been unwilling to address legally limiting the use of cyber
weapons so as to allow for maximum flexibility in the conduct of cyber operations.
Scale Score:
Justification:
36. The inequality of technological capabilities has been a primary reason why leading
cyber states have been unwilling to address legally limiting the use of cyber weapons.
Scale Score:
Justification:
37. The exponential growth of technology would most likely leave any specific cyber
warfare legislation obsolete shortly after it was enacted.
Scale Score:
Justification:
38. Any international agreement to limit the use of cyber weapons is likely to be ignored
during an actual conflict by those states capable of using them effectively; regardless
of whether they are a signatory to the treaty.
Scale Score:
Justification:
39. Preemptive cyber attacks can be morally justified if the evidence exceeds a ninety
percent likelihood of armed attack and that the provocation is expected to cause a
high degree of damage or casualties.
Scale Score:
Justification:
40. States have an obligation to defend their citizens from cyber attacks even to the extent
of using some illegal or unethical means to do so.
Scale Score:
Justification:
41. Each state has an affirmative duty to formally review the legality of any cyber
weapon and operation prior to its deployment.
Scale Score:
Justification:

168
42. Each state has an affirmative duty to continuously monitor their cyber attacks, when
feasible, so as to cancel or suspend the attack if conditions change such as posing a
threat to the civilian population.
Scale Score:
Justification:
********************* END OF SURVEY *********************

